Tbe appeal challenges tbe validity of tbe order allowing to tbe plaintiff support and counsel fees pendente lite. Objection is advanced on tbe theory that tbe action is brought under and based entirely on G. S., 50-7 (4) — a subsection of tbe statute relating to divorce from bed and board, which names as one of tbe grounds for such divorce “such indignities to tbe person of tbe other as tp render bis or her condition intolerable and life burdensome.” It is pointed out as a fatal defect in tbe pleading that plaintiff does not, in particularizing tbe acts or misconduct of tbe defendant said to have bad that effect further allege *284that the conduct was without adequate provocation on her part, ergo fails to state a cause of action. If plaintiff’s action, or rather her grounds for relief, can be put into that category, ignoring all other available statutory grounds for relief, the established standards of pleading and practice, as found in our decisions, might support appellant’s view. McManus v. McManus, 191 N. C., 740, 133 S. E., 9; Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N. C., 572, 35 S. E. (2d), 636; Howell v. Howell, 223 N. C., 62, 25 S. E. (2d), 169; Pollard v. Pollard, 221 N. C., 46, 19 S. E. (2d), 1; Carnes v. Carnes, 204 N. C., 636, 169 S. E., 222; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 109 N. C., 139, 13 S. E., 887; Jackson v. Jackson, 105 N. C., 433, 11 S. E., 173. But we do not concede that the major premise is sound: The statute, G. S., 50-16, relating to alimony without divorce, and plaintiff’s pleading of the grounds therein recognized as cause for the relief sought are both broader than that assumption implies.
Since the plaintiff does not ask for divorce, but merely adds to the prayer a request for “such other and further relief as might appear just and proper,” the court will refer the proceeding to G. S., 50-16, as an action for alimony without divorce, as was no doubt intended. We quote the pertinent part of that action, italicizing the phrase which appellant’s counsel contend ties in the proceeding with an action for divorce a mensa under G. S., 50-7, and especially with subsection 4 of that law as above stated:
“If any husband shall separate himself from his wife and fail to provide her and the children of the marriage with the necessary subsistence according to his means and condition in life, or if he shall be a drunkard or spendthrift, or be guilty of any misconduct or acts that would be or constitute cause for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, the wife may institute an action in the superior court of the county in which the cause of action arose to have a reasonable subsistence and counsel fees allotted and paid or secured to her from the estate or earnings of her husband.”
It will appear, then, that there is available to the wife in an action for alimony without divorce not only the grounds independently stated in the quoted statute, but, by inclusive reference, any ground that would constitute cause of divorce, either absolute or from bed and board.
In lodging his objection appellant might have said, with strict accuracy, that the rule suggested has been applied to most of the other grounds for divorce a mensa named in the statute with the practical effect that the grounds borrowed from the statute relating to divorce from bed and board cannot be successfully asserted without the corresponding denial of adequate provocation; even extending to abandonment, which imports willfullness, and maliciously turning the spouse out of doors, and cruel and barbarous treatment endangering life; as to all of which the *285excuse of “adequate provocation.” is somewhat remote. McManus v. McManus, supra; McIntosh, Civil Procedure, p. 407.
Referring more especially to subsection 4, relating to indignities to the person, the origin and propriety of requiring allegation and proof that there was no adequate provocation rests in the difficulty of defining more precisely the acts which might come under condemnation of the law, coupled with the deference traditionally shown to the necessity of mutual forbearance in the marital venture. In a measure, the device controls the extent to which the law is willing to invade that field with judicial remedies, resulting in separation. For extension of the rule to other more specifically defined conduct, we must refer to the history, rather than the logic, of the law. But there are less relative acts of the husband upon which alimony without divorce may be granted, stated as violations of positive requirements which, as we view them in the light of the decided cases, do not suggest the necessity of applying the principle of domestic balances. It is not necessary to couple the allegation of such misconduct with a denial of provocation. Such, at least, is adultery. The statute also mentions independently as grounds for alimony that the husband is a spendthrift or a drunkard; and there is a substantial difference between G. S., 50-16, and G. S., 50-7 (5), in phraseology and implication as to drunkenness.
The complaint is somewhat informal, and the incidents alleged as grounds for relief mainly fall under G. S., 50-7 (4), as indignities to the person, or other subsections of the statute relating to divorce from bed and board; and many of these allegations are defective, as.contended for by the appellant, in failing to comply with the above mentioned rule; but not all of the allegations of the complaint are affected with this invalidity. In alleging that the defendant had illicit relations with numerous lewd women, and especially with Alice Oox, there is a sufficient charge of adultery. The complaint also charges that he has become addicted to drunkenness, and that he has wasted large sums of money upon the subjects of his amours. We refrain from pushing through the mill of definition the terms used in the statute — “drunkard” and “spendthrift” — and comparing them with the allegations of the complaint, and we make no decision with respect to them. However, upon the analysis we have given, we are of opinion that the complaint does state a cause of action, and so hold. The practical result of its partial invalidity would be that the plaintiff on the trial, and upon timely objection, cannot, without amendment, rely on the causes of action pointed out, which have been heretofore held by numerous decisions of this Court to be fatally defective.
The question of condonation cannot be determined adversely to the complaint as a matter of law, since there is sufficient allegation of con*286duct which might revive the old grounds for relief, whatever they are. Lassiter v. Lassiter, 92 N. C., 130; Jones v. Jones, 173 N. C., 279, 91 S. E., 960; Page v. Page, 167 N. C., 346, 347, 83 S. E., 625; Gordon v. Gordon, 88 N. C., 45; Collier v. Collier, 16 N. C., 352.
We conclude that the order for alimony and counsel fees pendente lite, having been made in a valid proceeding, is valid and binding upon the defendant; subject, however, to the modification hereinafter made.
We are of opinion that the order of the judge requiring the defendant to pay sums supposed to be due under the previous order dated 2 October, 1944, in the action previously dismissed, was, inadvertently we are sure, beyond his jurisdiction, both because of the vagueness of the reference in the complaint and because of the dismissal of that action before final judgment.
As thus modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.