On this record the rule in Shelley’s case is not controlling. Matthews v. Matthews, 214 N. C., 204, 198 S. E., 663; Williamson v. Cox, 218 N. C., 117, 10 S. E. (2d), 662; Paul v. Paul, 199 N. C., 522, 154 S. E., 825; Willis v. Trust Co., 183 N. C., 267, 111 S. E., 163; Ford v. McBrayer, 171 N. C., 420, 88 S. E., 736; Dawson v. Ennett, 151 N. C., 543, 66 S. E., 566; Harrell v. Hagan, 147 N. C., 111; Hampton v. Griggs, 184 N. C., 13, 113 S. E., 501.
The deed to Jane Messer conveyed a base or qualified fee, defeasible upon her death without “bodily heirs” or “issue,” upon the happening of which event plaintiffs would become seized and possessed of the title under the limitation over. Smith v. Lumber Co., 155 N. C., 389, 71 S. E., 445; Hutchinson v. Lucas, 181 N. C., 53, 106 S. E., 150; Thompson v. Humphrey, 179 N. C., 44, 101 S. E., 738; Willis v. Trust Co., supra; James v. Griffin, 192 N. C., 285, 134 S. E., 849; West v. Murphy, 197 N. C., 488, 149 S. E., 731.
To determine the effectiveness of the limitation over the roll must be called as of the date of the death of the first taker. It is so declared by statute. Ch. 7, Public Laws 1827, now G. S., 41-4; Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N. C., 448, 99 S. E., 401 (citing 26 prior decisions); Perrett v. Bird, 152 N. C., 220, 67 S. E., 507; Smith v. Lumber Co., supra; *137 Rees v. Williams, 164 N. C., 128, 80 S. E., 247; Willis v. Trust Co., supra; Vinson v. Gardner, 185 N. C., 193, 116 S. E., 412; Dupree v. Daughtridge, 188 N. C., 193, 124 S. E., 148; Yarn Co. v. Dewstoe, 192 N. C., 121, 133 S. E., 407; Massengill v. Abell, 192 N. C., 240, 134 S. E., 641; Henderson v. Power Co., 200 N. C., 443, 157 S. E., 425; Hudson v. Hudson, 208 N. C., 338, 180 S. E., 597; Moseley v. Knott, 212 N. C., 651, 194 S. E., 100; Thames v. Goode, 217 N. C., 639, 9 S. E. (2d), 485.
So then we come to the primary question posed by this appeal: Do the terms “bodily heirs” and “issue” as used in the deed include lineal descendants other than children? Our decisions answer in the affirmative.
“Bodily heirs,” when used as descriptio personarum, and “issue” are synonymous terms connoting and embracing'children, grandchildren, and other lineal descendants. Matthews v. Matthews, supra; Harrell v. Hagan, supra; Bowden v. Lynch, 173 N. C., 203, 91 S. E., 957; Albright v. Albright, 172 N. C., 351, 90 S. E., 303; Pugh v. Allen, 179 N. C., 307, 102 S. E., 394; Willis v. Trust Co., supra; Hampton v. Griggs, supra; Moseley v. Knott, supra; Brown v. Holland, 221 N. C., 135, 19 S. E. (2d), 255; Elledge v. Parrish, 224 N. C., 397. For cases in other jurisdictions see 22 Words and Phrases, 742, et seq. See also 5 Words and Phrases, 583, et seq.
Discussing the question in Matthews v. Matthews, supra, we said:
“The term ‘bodily heirs’ ... is more comprehensive than the term children, and means progeny or issue, and includes children, grandchildren and other lineal descendants. It is true that in some of the cases in which this term is interpreted when used as descripiio persona-rum-, it is said that it means children: However, an examination of those cases will disclose that only children were concerned and no grandchildren were involved.”
The court below, it is true, held that upon the birth of Charlie Messer the condition in the deed was fulfilled and, non constat he predeceased Jane Messer, she thereupon became seized in fee absolute, but this was harmless error. She left surviving grandchildren. Hence the event — • death without issue — upon the happening of which plaintiffs were to take, never occurred. Thus they possess no interest in or claim to the property in controversy.
The conclusion that the grantors intended to convey a fee, defeasible only upon death without lineal descendant, is fortified by the circumstances of the conveyance as disclosed by the language in the deed. The •consideration was love and affection. The property was conveyed as an advancement in satisfaction of the grantee’s interest in the estate of her parents. It was to descend to the other children of grantors only in the *138event the grantee died without issue. Thus they wrote into the deed just what the law provides.
No reason is apparent why the grantors should cut the succession in the interest of other children and deprive the grandchildren of Jane Messer of the privilege of transmitting the inheritance. On the contrary, it clearly appears that they intended that title to the property should remain in Jane Messer’s line of descent in the event there was anyone in that line to take at her death.
As her title, at her death, ripened into a fee absolute and her deed is binding upon her heirs, Thames v. Goode, supra; Woody v. Cates, 213 N. C., 792, 197 S. E., 561, the defendants, on their affirmative plea, were entitled to a decree that they are now the owners of the locus free of any claim of plaintiff. The court below so held.
The judgment is
Affirmed.