Tbe appellants base their contention that plaintiff was contributorily negligent very narrowly on the fact that he did not stop or cut down his rate of travel, which was not unlawful, when meeting and passing another car, about 25 feet from the defendants’ truck, which was parked without lights or flares in the center of the right-hand lane over which plaintiff had the right of way. At that point, defendants contend, the plaintiff ivas momentarily blinded by an approaching car; and his negligence in not stopping is therefore a contributing approximate cause of his injury. A much broader view of the occurrence and its component and related factors is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary prudence under the circumstances and conditions which prevailed at the time of the collision. In this respect, the task of the reviewing court on the question of contributory negligence is not merely to determine from the weight of the evidence, however convincing, whether plaintiff was negligent — that would be for the jury; but to say whether his contributory negligence is so clearly apparent that no person with a reasonable mind could draw any other inference. Neal v. R. R., 126 N. C., 634, 36 S. E., 117; Hayes v. Western, Union Telegraph Co., 211 N. C., 192, 193, 189 S. E., 499; Godwin v. R. R., 220 N. C., 281, 17 S. E. (2d), 137; McCrowell v. R. R., 221 N. C., 366, 374, 20 S. E. (2d), 352.
The development of the laws of the road since the advent of the motor vehicle has proceeded on one theory: that the duties of those who use the highway are correlative. The law has never put on the traveller the impossible task of protecting himself solely by his own circumspection against every danger that may beset him on the highway through its use or abuse by others, thus making him an insurer of his own safety. Reasonable provisions in the laws for the protection of travel on the highways enter into and become a part of the measure of prudent conduct on the part of those who are compelled to use them in common with others. While the rule of the ordinarily prudent man is not changed as a standard of conduct, certainly the ordinarily prudent man must be permitted to put some reliance on compliance with the most common and ordinary laws or rules established for his protection, or be driven from the road; and unless this correlative principle is recognized in its bearing upon the rule of prudence, those for whose protection the laws were made must proceed with as high a degree of care as if they never existed- — a thing impossible under modern conditions, and nowhere observed.
There are two applications of this principle appropriate to this case:
1. The plaintiff was not required to anticipate that the defendants’ truck would be parked with all four wheels on the pavement in the right-hand lane of travel without lights, flares, or any other mode of signal or warning. G. S., 20-161. That it was so parked, and had been so parked *632for a considerable time is clear from plaintiff’s evidence, notwithstanding partial contradiction from the corporate defendant’s driver. A witness saw it in that condition a considerable time before the collision, called to the colored man in the truck, and got no response. Moreover, as one of the factors tending to the plaintiff’s undoing, the truck showed up merely as a mud-spattered, film-covered, gray shape, so merged in the gray background of road and mist as to be unnoticeable except at close quarters.
2. The plaintiff proceeded a few feet within the blinding glare of an approaching car. Both cars dimmed or slanted the headlights in passing as they are required to do. G. S., 20-181. It is contended that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in not reducing his speed or stopping altogether at this point. He was then almost at the crisis of the affair, and whether he could have diminished the force of the collision or have avoided it altogether is a matter of speculation, or at least of fact about which reasonable minds might differ. Leonard v. Transfer Co., 218 N. C., 667, 12 S. E. (2d), 729; Cole v. Koonce, 214 N. C., 188, 198 S. E., 637; Williams v. Express Lines, 198 N. C., 193, 151 S. E., 197; Clarke v. Martin, 215 N. C., 405, 2 S. E. (2d), 10; In Buohl v. Brewing Co., 349 Pa., 377, 37 A. (2d), 524, the rule is laid down:
“The operator of a motor vehicle is not bound to foresee that another will permit his vehicle to stand on the highway at night without lights. Nelson v. Damus Bros. Co., Inc., 340 Pa., 49, 51, 16 A. (2d), 18. We have consistently held that a fixed rule cannot be laid down which will determine in every instance the person legally responsible for a rear-end collision on a highway at night between a parked vehicle and one that is moving. Nelson v. Damus Bros. Co., supra; Harkins v. Somerset Bus Co., 308 Pa., 109, 162 A., 163 (and other cases). Temporary blinding caused by bright lights on an oncoming or parked vehicle has been recognized as a legally sufficient excuse for failing to stop within the assured clear distance ahead. (Citing cases.) Under the decisions of this Court the trial judge properly submitted to the jury the question of appellee’s contributory negligence.”
In Boor v. Schreiber (Pa.), 33 A. (2d), 648, it is said:
“It is now settled by Farley v. Ventresco, 307 Pa., 441, 161 A., 534, that a driver is not bound to stop merely because he is 'blinded’ by the headlights of another vehicle. . . . We are not prepared to say, as a matter of law, plaintiff should have anticipated defendants’ 'blacked-out’ truck lurking behind the curtain.” But this much must be clear as a matter of law: he was not required even under those circumstances to anticipate that an unlighted and unguarded truck was in his path, or, in other words, to anticipate the gross negligence of the truck driver in this respect. Hobbs v. Coach Co., ante, 323, 34 S. E. (2d), 211. Nor can he be held for contributory negligence as a matter of law because he did not *633stop when momentarily blinded, nor because the slanting or passing rays of his lights did not pick up the body of the truck, which stood some 3% feet above the road. Williams v. Express Lines, supra.
The meeting of cars on a much used thoroughfare is a constant occurrence. That this should happen at a point involving other dangers is a coincidence frequently occurring, and the multiple consequences of the violation of this law, enacted for the safety of life and limb, may well be considered within its contemplation and its prevention within its purpose. The driver is not required to proceed as if he were apt at any moment to encounter an unlighted truck in his way. “A motorist may assume that no vehicle will be left standing on the main highway at night without a warning light.” Blashfield, p. 341, sec. 1203. It should be understood that we are speaking on the question of ordinary care as applied to the facts of this case. Under the existing circumstances, the plaintiff could have sustained no injury save from the negligent parking of the truck — a negligence which he was not required to anticipate, but only to exercise ordinary care in its discovery and such means of avoidance as prudence might dictate when he became aware of it.
In factual features, the case is not unlike Cole v. Koonce, supra, and Williams v. Express Lines, supra, in which we held, and we repeat, that generally speaking on the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the matter must be decided upon the facts of the particular case; and in the case at bar we are unable to separate any item so unaffected by its attendant circumstances that we are able to declare with the positiveness required by the rule that there are no inferences favorable to the plaintiff on the question of contributory negligence. Under the circumstances, the conduct of the plaintiff on that issue was a matter for the jury, and they have spoken.
We find
No error.
Barnhill, Winborne, and Denny, JJ., concur in result.