We do not deem it necessary to summarize all tbe testimony or to enter into a discussion of its probative force further than to say there was sufficient evidence offered to repel tbe motion to dismiss under G. S., 15-173.
Tbe contention that there is no competent evidence of tbe cause of death is without merit. Tbe deceased was a young man in apparent good health. He received a traumatic injury which crushed his skull and affected the brain tissue. He died almost immediately thereafter. Certainly this warrants the inference that death was caused by the crushed skull and the injured brain tissue.
The court instructed the jury in part as follows:
“In the absence of some admission or evidence establishing an opposite presumption sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, the most that can be required of a defendant in a criminal prosecution is explanation but not exculpation. The defendant is not required to show his innocence; the State must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of .this ultimate issue never shifts.”
To this instruction the defendant excepts and assigns the same as error. The exception must be sustained.
The witness did not take the stand in his own behalf or offer other testimony. Nor did he plead self-defense. He elected instead to rely upon the weakness of the evidence offered by the State. There was no admission of the use of a deadly weapon and the evidence in respect thereto was circumstantial. Hence the testimony was not such as to justify a peremptory instruction in the absence of explanation. S. v. Singleton, 183 N. C., 738, 110 S. E., 846; S. v. Ellis, 210 N. C., 166, 185 S. E., 663; S. v. Davis, 223 N. C., 381, 26 S. E. (2d), 869.
The defendant had the right to go upon the witness stand and explain or attempt to explain the facts and circumstances about which the State had offered testimony so as to negative their incriminating effect. But there is no law which requires him to do so. He may elect either to go forward with testimony or rest upon the weakness of the State’s case, in which event he takes the risk of an adverse verdict.
That the suggestion to a contrary effect contained in the instruction is prejudicial to the defendant-has already been decided by this Court. S. v. Stone, 224 N. C., 848.
*543In this connection it may be well to note that a careful reading of Speas v. Bank, 188 N. C., 524, 125 S. E., 398, will disclose that the Stone case is not out of harmony with what is there said.
The coroner of the county, witness for the State, although not found to be an expert, was permitted to give in evidence his opinion as to the cause of death.
Ordinarily opinion evidence of a lay witness is not admissible. It is the province of the jury to decide what inferences and conclusions are warranted by the testimony. Such evidence is admissible only when a person of ordinary experience would not be capable of forming a satisfactory conclusion unaided by expert information from one who has special learning, skill, or experience in the matter at issue. S. v. Dilliard, 223 N. C., 446, 27 S. E. (2d), 85; S. v. Smith, 221 N. C., 278, 20 S. E. (2d), 313.
Before such evidence is admissible a witness must qualify as an expert in that field of knowledge. The preliminary question of competency is for the presiding judge and ordinarily such ruling is conclusive. S. v. Smith, 223 N. C., 457, 27 S. E. (2d), 114, and cases cited.
In S. v. Smith, 221 N. C., 278, 20 S. E. (2d), 313, the competency of the opinion testimony of an embalmer as to the cause of death was challenged by exceptive assignment of error. This Court, as reference to that opinion will disclose, did not decide the question presented. It was held only that its admission under the circumstances of that case was harmless. We there said:
“To what extent the experience of a professional embalmer, with a knowledge of the blood vessels of the human body and their functions, and with ocular evidence that they had been emptied of their life-sustaining content, might qualify him to testify that the deceased had bled to death through the severed arteries, we do not need to say . . .”
For the reasons stated there must be a
New trial.