Tbe appellant has abandoned bis first seven and tbe tenth exceptions.
Tbe court, over tbe objection of tbe defendant, permitted Willie M’Wbite, a State’s witness, to testify to a conversation which be bad with tbe wife of tbe defendant, in tbe absence of tbe defendant, as to tbe manner in which tbe deceased, Jetter T. Connor, came to bis death. Tbe wife of tbe defendant bad already been on tbe witness stand and testified tbat tbe deceased attacked tbe defendant with a butcher knife. Her testimony was in conflict with her prior statements, according to tbe testimony of tbe witness M’Wbite. And, in giving tbe State’s contentions in tbe charge to tbe jury, bis Honor said: “Tbe State contends . . . tbat you should be satisfied from tbe testimony of another M’Wbite, Willie, I believe they called him, who shortly thereafter bad gone to talk with tbe witness, Columbia, and tbat she told him tbat her husband bad killed him with bis band, and no mention was made of any knife, and from all tbe statements you should be satisfied, in tbe first place, beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no knife, and in tbe second place, you should be satisfied tbe knife bad been taken from tbe possession of tbe decedent and be was wholly and completely unarmed or disarmed at tbe time tbe blow was administered tbat proved to be fatal to tbe decedent, and tbat at least you should return a verdict of at least guilty of manslaughter.”
Tbe exceptions to tbe admission of tbe above evidence and to the foregoing part of tbe charge, constitute tbe defendant’s sixth assignment of error.
It was competent for tbe State to contradict tbe testimony of tbe defendant’s wife, by showing prior inconsistent statements made by her, *367and tbe evidence of tbe witness M’Wbite was competent for that purpose. However, tbe defendant did not request that this evidence be considered only for tbe purpose of contradicting or impeaching tbe testimony of bis wife and not as substantive testimony against him. Therefore, tbe objection to its admission cannot be sustained. S. v. Shepherd, 220 N. C., 377, 17 S. E. (2d), 469; S. v. Casey, 212 N. C., 352, 193 S. E., 411; S. v. Ray, 212 N. C., 725, 194 S. E., 482; Rule of the Supreme Court, 221 N. C., 558. Likewise, tbe evidence having been generally admitted, a contention of tbe State based thereon, given in tbe charge to tbe jury, without objection at tbe time, will not be held for error. S. v. King, 219 N. C., 667, 14 S. E. (2d), 803; S. v. Johnson, 219 N. C., 757, 14 S. E. (2d), 792; S. v. Bowser, 214 N. C., 249, 199 S. E., 31. Ordinarily tbe failure to object in apt time to a statement of contention by tbe court, constitutes waiver of tbe right to object. S. v. Wells, 221 N. C., 144, 19 S. E. (2d), 243.
Exceptions eleven through fifty-six are also directed to tbe charge of tbe court. But none of these exceptions are brought forward in appellant’s brief and argued or authorities cited in support thereof, as required by Rule 28, Rules of Practice in tbe Supreme Court, 221 N. C., 563. Hence, these exceptions will be treated as abandoned.
Tbe appellant does argue in bis brief that tbe trial court failed to “state in a plain and correct manner tbe evidence given in tbe case and declare and explain tbe law arising thereon,” as required by G. S., 1-180, but there is no exception in tbe record based on such failure on tbe part of the court, to comply with tbe statute. An argument unsupported by exception is as ineffective as an exception without argument or citation of authority. Curlee v. Scales, 223 N. C., 788, 28 S. E. (2d), 576. An exception for failure to charge tbe jury as required by G. S., 1-180, must be taken in tbe same manner as any other exception to the charge and an assignment of error based thereon, “must particularize and point out specifically wherein tbe court failed to charge the law arising on the evidence.” S. v. Dilliard, 223 N. C., 446, 27 S. E. (2d), 85. Failure to particularize and point out wherein tbe court failed to comply with the statute will constitute such exception a mere broadside exception, and it will not be considered, unless it is pointed out in some other exception or exceptions to the charge wherein tbe court failed to comply with the statute. S. v. Friddle, 223 N. C., 258, 25 S. E. (2d), 751, and S. v. Billiard, supra, and cases there cited. A careful consideration of tbe charge, however, discloses no prejudicial error.
Tbe remaining exceptions are formal and cannot be sustained.
In the trial below, we find