The stipulations and admissions of the parties, taken together with the grounds on which it is sought to terminate the trust, leave little to be said by the Court.
Following the reference made to the case "In re Murray’s Will, 141 N. C., 588,” we find that in that proceeding, the will was principally challenged because of the trust now under consideration in this Court. "With reference to the trust, it was there contended that its provisions were so vague that no cestui que trust was definitely ascertainable from its terms. Although in that case Justice Connor, speaking for the Court, declared that the question of validity of the trust on account of such supposed vagueness was not then before the Court, the opinion proceeds to find that there is no defect in that respect. On the present appeal, that question is presented, and we think answered by the stipulations.
The date of the will — 1895—is worthy of note. The benevolence of the donor recalls the educational enthusiasm of the period. It is. reminiscent of the brilliant crusade of Mclver and Alderman, and later of Aycock. It is a history into which was written the aspirations of our whole people; and in the intervening years, the State has accomplished *82much. We agree with the encomium counsel for the appellants bave addressed to public school progress. Even some of the smaller towns bave a larger investment in educational facilities, and buildings more commodious and impressive tban tbe University of North Carolina afforded when Aycock, Mclver and Alderman matriculated there. The public school term has been increased under the Constitution from four to six months, and by statute to a minimum of eight months, and a maximum of nine months, if the district or the county may so request. Appropriations are large, considering per capita wealth, and the opportunities of free tuition afforded the youth of the State have been vastly enlarged. But it is not claimed by the most optimistic that this amazing progress has saturated the public demand or the public need. Teacher load is a serious problem, menacing efficiency of instruction. Individual attention to backward children is a related unsolved problem. If the Murray trust were instigated today, we could not, as a matter of law, deny it a place in the all-out educational effort upon the argument advanced, if we were permitted to entertain it at all.
However, the adequacy of the public school system to meet the educational needs of the children of indigent parents is not a question we may consider in passing upon the legality and propriety of the further continuance of a charitable trust having the same purpose in view.
The State maintains no monopoly in the education of its citizens. It neither requires nor expects that its youth receive tuition exclusively within the State sponsored public schools. The compulsory attendance law recognizes the private schools teaching comparable branches, and gives credit for attendance there. Neither the school law nor the educational policy of the State excludes private educational enterprise patently conducive to the public welfare. The reasons are cogent and too numerous for discussion here. So long as there remains the liberty to attend the schools it provides, there remains the raison, d’etre of a charitable trust of this character, no matter how adequate the public school system provided by the State may become.
Indeed, there is implied in the definition of charitable trusts, whose purposes almost necessarily are found amongst those which all enlightened countries recognize as also obligations of government, that they may, as coadjutors, stand side by side with State agencies instituted and maintained for the same purpose.
“A charity may be defined as a gift to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of *83government.” Scott on Trusts, sec. 368; Whitsett v. Clapp, 200 N. C., 647, 649, 158 S. E., 183.
The appellants have admitted tbat even in prosperous Asheville and Buncombe County, as indeed elsewhere in all the world, the Biblical adage holds true: “Ye have the poor always with you”; and that there are, in the area covered by the trust, those who may qualify as beneficiaries. The plaintiffs, we think, are concluded by this admission.
We find nothing in the record that would justify dissolution of the trust. The judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.