The question here posed is whether the record permits the inference that Hegler’s death resulted from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. If so, the judgment is correct; otherwise, it should be reversed.
That the accident occurred in the course of the employment is conceded, or at least the fact is apparent. Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723, 153 S. E., 266. That it arose out of the employment is a legitimate inference from the record. Ashley v. Chevrolet Co., 222 N. C., 25, 21 S. E. (2d), 834.
Smith was angered because the deceased criticized his work and complained about it to the officials of the company. The assault followed two days after the report to the company and was thus directly connected with the employment. The Commission so finds, and this makes *671it a compensable death under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act. Eller v. Leather Go., 222 N. 0., 23, 21 S. E. (2d), 809.
It is true, the assailant had been heard to saj that he was going to kick the deceased all over the cloth room before leaving, but this was because of resentment over the impeachment of his work. Undoubtedly the friction between the two employees, which continued with intermittent bickerings for nearly a year, had its origin in the employment. While the assault may have resulted from anger or revenge, still it was rooted in and grew out of the employment. Anno. 72 A. L. E., 110.
To accept the defendant’s version of the matter, even though it may appear the more reasonable, would be to reject the opposing inferences which support the fact-finding body. Kearns v. Furniture Go., 222 N. C., 438, 23 S. E. (2d), 310; Lassiter v. Tel. Go., 215 N. C., 227, 1 S. E. (2d), 542. Where the record is such as to permit either finding, the determination of the Industrial Commission is conclusive on appeal. Buchanan v. Highway Com., 217 N. 0., 173, 7 S. E. (2d), 382; Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman Go., 213 N. 0., 356, 196 S. E., 342.
The award in Wilson v. Boyd & Goforth, 207 N. C., 344, 177 S. E., 178, on the facts there appearing, which was sustained on appeal, lends color to the conclusion here reached. See, also, Anderson v. Security Building Go., 100 Conn., 373, 123 Atl., 843, 4 A. L. E., 1119.
Speaking to a similar situation in Pekin Cooperage Go. v. Industrial Com., 285 Ill., 31, 120 N. E., 530, where a workman was injured in a quarrel with another over interference with his work, the Court said : “Where men are working together at the same work disagreements may be expected to arise about the work, the manner of doing it, as to the use of tools, interference with one another, and many other details which may be trifling or important. Infirmity of temper, or worse, may be expected, and occasionally blows and fighting. Where the disagreement arises out of the employer’s work in which two men are engaged and as a result of it one injures the other, it may be inferred that the injury arose out of the employment.”
In Chambers v. Oil Go., 199 N. C., 28, 153 S. E., 594, Brogden, J., put it this way: “It is a self-evident fact that men required to work in daily and intimate contact with other men are subjected to certain hazards by reason of the very contact itself because all men are not alike. Some are playful and full of fun; others are serious and diffident. Some are careless and reckless; others are painstaking and cautious. The assembling of such various types of mind and skill into one place must of necessity create and produce certain risks and hazards by virtue of the very employment itself. . . . Such risks, therefore, are incident to the business and grow out of it. In an ordinary suit for damages for personal injury the workman assumes the ordinary risks of the business, *672but the Compensation Act in such case imposes the ordinary risk of the business upon the employer. That is to say, the employer and not the' workman must assume the ordinary risks of the business or employment.”
The judgment of the Superior Court will be upheld.