Four questions were raised and argued here: (a) Whether the Superior Court of Greene County had jurisdiction in the matter; (b) whether the judgment signed by Judge Oranmer is void; (c) whether the entry made on the judgment docketed canceling the judgment as to W. M. Warren had the effect of releasing the other defendants; and (d) whether, under all the evidence, such a judgment constituted a cloud on the title.
We do not consider it proper to go any deeper into the merits of these questions than may be necessary to decide as to the propriety and validity of the order continuing the injunction to the hearing. We are, however, of the opinion that the allegations and supporting evidence are sufficiently meritorious to justify the continuance of the injunction — in protection of the res — until the matters can be more fully heard and determined by the trial court.
As to the jurisdiction of Greene County Superior Court to entertain 'this case and grant injunctive, relief, we think it proper to say that, while we leave to the court below to say upon its hearing whether the judgment here challenged is of that character, a void judgment may he attacked at any time and any place where it might injure or defeat a substantial right; Monroe v. Niven, 221 N. C., 362, 20 S. E. (2d), 311; Clark v. Carolina Homes, 189 N. C., 703, 128 S. E., 20; Hargrove v. Wilson, 148 N. C., 439, 62 S. E., 520; and, ordinarily, the aid of the law to prevent its enforcement may' be invoked in the jurisdiction where the injury is threatened.
An action to quiet title or to remove a cloud from the title is equitable in its nature, and may now be maintained to remove from the title a cloud created by the apparent lien of an invalid judgment docketed in the county where the land lies, the original statute having been enlarged by amendment to that effect by chapter 763, Public Laws of 1903. G. S., 41-10, par. 2, and historical annotations.
*552Originally, such an action could only be maintained as against a contrary claim for an interest in the land. In enlarging the statute to cover the subject indicated, the statute now provides:
“In any case in which judgment has been or shall be docketed, whether such judgment is in favor of or against the person bringing such action, or is claimed by him, or affects real estate claimed by him, or whether such judgment is in favor of or against the person against’whom such action may be brought, or is claimed by him, or affects real estate claimed by him, the lien of said judgment shall be such claim of an estate or interest in real estate as is contemplated by this section.”
Treated as such an interest or claim of interest in the land, the venue is as laid down in G. S., 1-16 (1). See further annotations G. S., 41-10.
"We have no doubt that had the sole relief sought been to declare the judgment here attacked void, an action for that purpose might have been brought in Durham County Superior Court, where the challenged judgment was rendered. This, however, does not affect the jurisdiction in the Superior Court of Greene County upon the cause of action stated in the complaint.
This question of jurisdiction has been directly raised here, and we have felt it consistent with the practice of the Court to deal with it, since, as the cause is determinable on that point, it would end the controversy. As to other matters, we express no opinion, except to say that there appears sufficient merit in plaintiff’s cause to justify the continuance of the injunction to the hearing.
Therefore, the order to that effect by Judge Frizzelle is
Affirmed.