The defendant was convicted of perjury. His appeal challenges the sufficiency of the charge as an explanation of the law relating to that crime and its application to the facts. C. S., 564. In view of the nature of the crime and the restrictions which are thrown around the evidence which must be adduced to procure conviction, we are of the opinion that the objection is well taken. We do not find, on an inspection of the instructions, that the jury was advised that the defendant could not be convicted except upon the testimony of at least two credible witnesses or one such witness and corroborative circumstances. The rule is stated by Chief Justice Stacy in S. v. Rhinehart, 209 N. C., 150, 154, 183 S. E., 388, as follows:
“In prosecutions for perjury, it is required that the falsity of the oath be established by two witnesses, or by one witness and adminicular circumstances sufficient to turn the scales against the defendant’s oath.” S. v. Hawkins, 115 N. C., 712, 20 S. E., 623; S. v. Peters, 107 N. C., 876, 12 S. E., 74; S. v. Sinodis, 205 N. C., 602, 172 S. E., 190.
Conceivably, the uncorroborated testimony of one witness might produce in the minds of the jury the satisfaction to a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused; in other words, convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of such guilt; but it is not sufficient in law, and the instruction, therefore, that if the jury is so satisfied from the evidence beyond *715a reasonable doubt they should return a verdict of guilty, while a satisfactory formula, in most cases, disregards conditions which the law declares essential to conviction of perjury, and therefore is not adequate.
The criminality of perjury is the violation of the sanctity of the oath, which, traditionally with English speaking people, is supposed to afford some security for a truthful statement. If the witness in his solemn adjuration has not the fear of God, a supplemental statute making perjury a felony might induce some fear of the law. However reprehensible and socially disturbing, a man cannot be convicted of crime for merely lying, although it may be a “lie with circumstance” or a “lie direct.” But it takes the false testimony to falsify the oath. And, since experience has shown that frailty in that respect may not be confined to the one suspected person, the law, from ancient times, has not been willing to “take one man’s word against another” upon a question of veracity, since, roughly speaking, it merely establishes an equilibrium. 41 Am. Jur., p. 37. At one time the law required the testimony of two witnesses; now, in almost every jurisdiction in this country, conviction may be had upon the testimony of one witness, corroborated by circumstances inconsistent with defendant’s innocence and directly tending to corroborate the accusing witness. Anno. Ill A. L. E., 825. In many jurisdictions it is required that the evidence corroborating the witness for the prosecution must be of a “strong character,” “strongly corroborative.” The requirement as to the strength of such evidence is variously expressed. Practically all of the opinions require it to be of direct and independent force. Cook v. U. S., 26 App. D. C., 427, 6 Ann. Gas., 810; U. S. v. Hall (D. C.), 44 E., 864, 10 L. R. A., 324; S. v. Raymond, 20 Iowa, 582.
We think it sufficient to say that the evidence, that is, the testimony of the witness, taken with the circumstances of corroboration, must convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt before the accused can be convicted of perjury.
In the instant case the conviction rests almost, if not entirely, upon the evidence of two State’s witnesses — Mrs. Bessie Bell and police officer H. M. Evans. Under the evidence, the usefulness of Mrs. Bell’s testimony was in identifying the defendant as the man who carried her home in the Pontiac car on the evening he was charged with speeding. Miss Chriscoe, who accompanied Mrs. Bell on that trip, did not identify the defendant. The circumstances attending that identification by Mrs. Bell were before the jury. Let us suppose that the jury may have found Mrs. Bell honestly mistaken in her identification, or that her memory was at fault, or for any other reason discredited and rejected her testimony altogether. Would the mere fact that she was superadded to the panel of witnesses making the necessary two satisfy the law and justify *716a conviction for no other reason than that two witnesses are arrayed against the accused, of whom the testimony of only one is received and credited ?
¥e are persuaded the law did not intend merely to out vote the accused in requiring the testimony of two witnesses. The law was intended to afford the defendant'a greater protection against the chance of unjust conviction than is ordinarily afforded in prosecuting for crime. It is analogous to prosecutions under C. S., 4339, which requires the sanction of corroboration before conviction.
In this case, of course, we have no opinion as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. We have merely illustrated the application of the law. It is not necessary for the trial court, figuratively speaking, to throw the book at the jury; but a substantial explanation of the law as applied to the evidence is required, and we cannot regard a clear statement of the conditions on which the defendant may be convicted as a matter of subordinate elaboration. Nor can we hold that its inadvertent omission by the able and impartial judge who tried this case as cured by the fact that, numerically speaking, two witnesses were arrayed against the defendant. That belongs to the mechanics, not to the philosophy, of the law.
There are other exceptions in the record upon which we do not pass, since they refer to incidents which may not recur. In failing to explain the law arising upon the evidence, there is error which entitles the defendant to a new trial. It is so ordered. ‘
New trial.