The complaint is a model of conciseness and fairness. It was obviously the purpose of the pleader to strip the case of non-essentials and bring the controversy to the real issue — at most a narrow one — -upon facts about which there could be no dispute. But the peculiar nature of the remedy sought, in view of the frank statements in the complaint, renders plaintiffs’ case vulnerable in two aspects: On the question whether they have the right to be heard at all in the attempted relitigation • of a matter already heard by a competent tribunal on the merits; and, if that obstacle is hurdled, whether the status of the railroad line at the taxable date, as described by the plaintiffs, brings it within the jurisdiction of the State Board of Assessment under applicable law. Machinery Act of 1939, ch. 310; Public Laws 1939, sec. 1612, et seq.j Miehie’s Code, 1939, sec. '7911 (193), et seq.
While the plaintiffs’ cause was heard independently on the merits, and action on the demurrers was reserved without prejudice to the defendants, the demurrer, ore tenus, renewed in this Court would bring both these questions up for decision. Raleigh v. Hatcher, 220 N. C., 613, 616, 18 S. E. (2d), 201; Gurganus v. McLawhorn, 212 N. C., 397, 193 S. E., 844; Staley v. Park, 202 N. C., 155, 156, 162 S. E., 202. It is hardly necessary, however, to give the plaintiffs’ position two fatal blows — by sustaining both demurrer and judgment on the merits; so we follow the pattern of the trial. It is not amiss to say, however, that mandamus is not a proper instrument to review or reverse an administrative board which has taken final action on a matter within its jurisdiction. Pue v. Hood, Comr. of Banks, 222 N. C., 310, 22 S. E. (2d), 896. If there has been an error in law, prejudicial to the parties, or the board has exceeded its authority, or has mistaken its power, or has abused its discretion — where the statute provides no appeal — the proper method of review is by certiorari. Belk’s Dept. Store, Inc., v. Guilford County, 222 N. C., 441, 446, 23 S. E. (2d), 897; Power Co. v. Burke County, 201 N. C., 318, 160 S. E., 173; Caldwell County v. Doughton, 195 N. C., 62, 141 S. E., 289. Subject to the right to review in this Court as it may exist under proper procedure, the final action of the Board will be held to be conclusive, and will be given effect in a subsequent proceeding involving the same matter.
*609However, on tbe hearing on the merits, plaintiffs’ petition for mandamus was properly denied. Speaking now not of the receivers, or representatives of the new company which has taken over the railroad properties for operation, who are not public officers and are not subject to mandamus to compel the performance of a private duty, but speaking of the members of the Board of Assessment who are public officers, mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the performance of a public duty of a ministerial nature, when this duty has been neglected or declined. There is no doubt that where the right to the writ has not been clouded by previous resort to other remedy, it will issue to compel the State Board of Assessment to perform the ministerial duties imposed upon them by the statute — but not to control them in the exercise of any discretion. The initial step of assuming jurisdiction over the railroad lines of common carriers may be regarded as ministerial, and the duty of reporting to each of the several counties its quota of the total valuation accruing to the mileage within it is of a like character.
But the mandamus, while no longer regarded as a high prerogative writ — as was its common law status — Person v. Watts, 184 N. C., 499, 505, 115 S. E., 336 — will not be issued unless the petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the writ. Poole v. Board of Examiners, 221 N. C., 199, 19 S. E. (2d), 635; Champion v. Board of Health, 221 N. C., 96, 19 S. E. (2d), 239; Harris v. Board of Education, 216 N. C., 147, 4 S. E. (2d), 328; Raleigh v. Public School System, ante, 316, 26 S. E. (2d), 591. Certainly it will not issue where upon the face of the petition or upon the facts disclosed in the evidence, the plaintiffs have no right to the relief they seek to obtain by such mandatory means. The ministerial duty, as well as the neglect or refusal to perform it, must clearly appear, since a peremptory mandamus is a writ of enforcement — or in the nature of an execution of the judgment of the Court. Powers v. Asheville, 203 N. C., 2, 164 S. E., 324; Cody v. Barrett, 200 N. C., 43, 156 S. E., 146; White v. Commissioners of Johnston County, 217 N. C., 329, 7 S. E. (2d), 825; Mears v. Board of Education, 214 N. C., 89, 197 S. E., 752.
~We agree with the court below that the evidence may be regarded as showing a definite abandonment of the road with respect to the common carriage of freight and passengers, and that its use in the removal and transportation of scrap material during the process of dismantling and salvage did not vest it with a character which would bring it within the jurisdiction of the State Board of Assessment for appraisal and taxation. We are assured of the correctness of this position on examination of the statute under which the State Board of Assessment exercises its duties, with special attention to the general purpose of the Act, especially the provisions regarding the apportionment of the total taxable *610value to tbe counties in tbe proportion tbat tbe mileage therein sustains to tbe total length of tbe road with which it is assessed. Sec. 1613; Micbie’s Code of 1939, sec. 7971 (191). In such total valuation is included tbe franchise which, with respect to the abandoned road, no longer exists and which, when the tariffs are canceled, cannot be exercised. Furthermore, the deterioration in value of the road itself, thus separated from its uses, would make the equation demanded by the statute so inequitable as to lead to the conclusion it was not intended by the law.
At various other places we find reference in the statute indicating that the law refers to roads in actual operation; and we have come to the conclusion that a road thus definitely abandoned and retired from the operative system, after a proper order respecting the convenience and necessity of its further operation as a carrying road has been granted for such abandonment, is no longer within the purview of the statute.
The listing of this property is the care of the local authorities. We might say here that the order of the State Board of Assessment that the local boards list the property as “scrap” is not binding upon them in so far as it characterizes the nature of the property. In the listing and the assessment of this property, they are to be guided by the same laws which apply to other property within their respective jurisdictions. It may be well to say, however, that since we consider the road as definitely, abandoned as a part of the operating system, and no more to be used as a carrying road, the property is not to be enhanced by attributing to it any element of value arising from that source. Otherwise, the result would simply be to transfer the jurisdiction from the State Board of Assessment to the local boards of appraisal, to be exercised upon similar considerations of value. This would be manifestly improper.
The judgment is
Affirmed.