Defendants contend the nonsuit should be sustained upon two grounds: (1) laches on the part of the plaintiffs, and (2) a valid tax deed to the defendants’ intestate.
1. Laches on the part of claimants is recognized by courts of equity, in proper cases, as an available defense against stale claims. It is generally defined to mean negligent omission for an unreasonable time to assert a right enforceable in equity. 30 C. J. S., 520; 19 Am. Jur., 338; Black’s Law Dictionary. “Laches is such delay in enforcing one’s rights as works disadvantage to another.” 30 C. J. S., 520. It may be invoked as a defense to the prosecution of a claim cognizable in equity when there has been inexcusable delay in moving to enforce it, on the ground that equity will refuse aid to a stale claim when a party has slept on his rights. Spiedel v. Henrici, 120 U. S., 311.
In Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N. C., 288, 199 S. E., 83, it was said: “In equity, where lapse of time has resulted in some change in the condition of the property or in the relations of the parties which would make it unjust to permit the prosecution of the claim, the doctrine of laches will *553be applied. Hence, wbat delay will constitute lacbes depends upon tbe facts and circumstances of eacb case.” Lacbes operated as a defense in that ease for tbe reason that plaintiffs “waited for approximately six years after tbe trust was disavowed and after tbe property bad been conveyed by tbe alleged trustee and until after tbe lips of tbe primary beneficiary were closed in death.”
When we consider tbe evidence here in tbe most favorable light for tbe plaintiffs, as we must do on a motion for nonsuit, we are unable to concur in tbe view that as a matter of law plaintiffs have lost their right to the equitable relief sought by reason of lacbes. Plaintiffs’ evidence tends to show that by virtue of an arrangement tbe rents from tbe land were to be paid to the bolder of tbe notes secured by tbe deeds of trust to be applied to tbe payment of tbe notes, interest and taxes, and that there was no repudiation of this understanding or denial of plaintiffs’ equities, unless Perry’s statement to a prospective purchaser of tbe land, in 1939, that “Stell hasn’t got a Chinaman’s chance,” be so construed. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ evidence tends to show repeated acknowledgment of plaintiffs’ title by J. B. Perry, in 1931, in 1934, and again in 1938 when he apparently directed tbe listing of tbe land for taxation in tbe name of N. R. Stell as owner. Tbe facts of this case, according to plaintiffs’ evidence, are substantially different from those upon which tbe principle of laches was held to apply in Teachey v. Gurley, supra. Nonsuit on this ground cannot be sustained.
2. While it was admitted that tbe proceedings leading up to tbe tax foreclosure sale and deed to J. B. Perry were in all respects regular, it also appears that J. B. Perry was tbe owner of tbe debt secured by tbe deeds of trust on the land, and thus was empowered by statute to pay the delinquent taxes and add tbe cost to bis debt, and in case of foreclosure as bolder of a lien be was a proper party to whom notice of tbe foreclosure proceedings was required to be given. Orange County v. Wilson, 202 N. C., 424, 163 S. E., 113. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ evidence is susceptible of tbe inference that by an arrangement to which Perry was party, tbe rents from tbe plaintiffs’ land were received in trust to be applied in part to tbe payment of taxes. Hence, bis purchase of a tax title to tbe land would be regarded in equity as inuring to tbe benefit of tbe trustor, there having been no disavowal of tbe trust.
It was said in Smith v. Smith, 150 N. C., 81, 63 S. E., 177, “It is a well settled rule that a person under any legal or moral obligation to pay tbe taxes cannot by neglecting to pay tbe same, and allowing tbe land to be sold in consequence of such neglect, add to or strengthen bis title by purchasing at tbe sale himself, or by subsequently buying from a stranger who purchased at tbe sale; otherwise, be would be allowed to gain an advantage from bis own fraud or negligence in failing to pay tbe *554taxes.” Tbis statement of tbe law was quoted with approval in Bailey v. Howell, 209 N. C., 712, 184 S. E., 476, and was again enunciated in King v. Lewis, 221 N. C., 315, 20 S. E. (2d), 305, where it was said the mortgagee’s purchase at a tax sale could not be used for the purpose of asserting any right in conflict with the mortgagor’s equity of redemption. Pearce v. Montague, 209 N. C., 42, 182 S. E., 707; Gauley v. Sutton, 150 N. C., 327, 64 S. E., 3; Brantly v. Kee, 58 N. C., 332. Nor could possession by Perry under the tax deed be regarded as adverse for the statutory period, since plaintiffs’ evidence tends to show the land was continuously occupied by plaintiffs’ tenants, at least up to November, 1934. Nor under plaintiffs’ evidence would the statutes of limitations begin to run against the plaintiffs in the absence of repudiation of the arrangement for payment of rent, or assumption of other adverse position by Perry.
While it is true the relationship of trustor and secured creditor in a deed of trust is not in all respects the same as that of mortgagor and mortgagee, and is not such as to render presumptively fraudulent purchases by the latter from the former (Murphy v. Taylor, 214 N. C., 393, 199 S. E., 382; Ferguson v. Blanchard, 220 N. C., 1, 16 S. E. [2d], 414), under the circumstances presented by plaintiffs’ evidence in this case, we think the creditor secured by the deeds of trust should not be permitted to acquire adverse title to trustor’s land by virtue of tax foreclosure sale and deed when, according to plaintiffs’ evidence, he was receiving the rents from the land under arrangement to apply the same in part to the payment of taxes. 19 B. O. L., 398.
The plaintiffs’ evidence is susceptible of the inference that as a consequence of the arrangement by which rents were paid to Perry to be applied to certain purposes a trust relationship was thereby created, the incidents and obligations of which a court of equity would recognize and enforce. Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N. C., 577, 160 S. E., 896; Rousseau, v. Gall, 169 N. C., 173, 85 S. E., 414; 65 C. J., 295.
- Under the rule, on the question of nonsuit, we have considered only the evidence tending to support plaintiffs’ claim. Consideration of all the evidence may determine the essential facts against them. We express no opinion as to that. But we think on this record the plaintiffs were entitled to have their case submitted to the jury.
We conclude that the learned judge was in error in allowing the motion to nonsuit, and that the judgment dismissing the action must be
Reversed.