There are many allegations and counter-allegations in the pleadings, the merits of which are not presented on this record. On the contrary, the question presented has little, if any, relation to the vital issues raised. Be that as it may, we must deal with the record as it is presented to us.
*700. Tbe evidence offered poses tbis question: Is tbe entry of transfer of a judgment, made under C. S., 618, by tbe attorney of tbe judgment creditor upon tbe margin of tbe judgment as docketed in tbe office of tbe clerk of tbe Superior Court, prima facie evidence of transfer? We are constrained to answer in tbe affirmative.
It is to be noted that plaintiff offered tbe original entry without tbe lattice markings indicating cancellation or spoliation thereof. It was admitted without objection. Hence, as presented to us, there are no “lattice lines” drawn across tbe transfer and no entry indicating cancellation or invalidation. We have tbe transfer to a trustee for tbe use and benefit of one of several judgment debtors signed by tbe attorney for tbe judgment creditor — and nothing more. We may take judicial notice of tbis fact only, unrelated to other matters alleged.
Tbe right of an attorney to compromise a judgment, ratification by tbe executrix, tbe application of tbe statute of limitations, and other legal questions debated in tbe briefs, are not presented.
Ordinarily, an attorney, by virtue of bis employment as such, has control and management of tbe suit in matters of procedure and may make agreements affecting tbe remedy he is endeavoring to pursue. Usually an implied authority for such agreements during the progress of tbe suit is presumed from bis office and employment. Chemical Co. v. Bass, 175 N. C., 426, 95 S. E., 766; Harrill v. R. R., 144 N. C., 542; Gardiner v. May, 172 N. C., 192, 89 S. E., 955; Deitz v. Bolch, 209 N. C., 202, 183 S. E., 384. See also In re Gibson, ante, 350.
Tbis comprehensive authority existing during tbe pendency of a suit does not continue after tbe rendition of judgment. Thereafter there are substantial limitations upon his implied right to act for and in behalf of bis client. What those limitations are, however, we need not now discuss or define, for here tbe statute itself confers, prima facie at least, tbe necessary authority. G. S., 618, makes provision for the transfer of judgments and expressly prescribes tbe duty of tbe attorney when a judgment is paid by one of several judgment debtors who requests a transfer. Having acted under tbe statute it is presumed that be acted within tbe scope of bis authority. Bank v. Penland, 206 N. C., 323, 173 S. E., 345; 7 C. J. S., 875, sec. 73; 5 Am. Jur., 307. Furthermore, tbe primary objective of a suit on a money demand is tbe collection of tbe debt. Tbe obtaining of judgment is merely a necessary step to that end. It will not be assumed that an attorney who is employed to prosecute an action to judgment is not also authorized to receive and receipt for tbe money demanded.
Tbis was a public record. Tbe entry of transfer by the attorney is expressly authorized by statute. .There is nothing in tbe transfer to indicate that be received less than full value. Anno., 66 A. L. R., 115. *701The entry is presumed to speak the truth and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is evidence of the actual authority of the attorney. To hold otherwise would tend to destroy confidence in public records and, in many instances, would create such uncertainty as to render them of little practical value.
The plaintiff did not offer any particular excerpt from the answer. The form in which admissions therein are offered, considered in connection therewith, leaves the meaning of the evidence too ambiguous for serious consideration.
The plaintiffs having shown, prima facie, that they are the owners of the judgment, they are entitled, at least, to an injunction against sale of Harrington’s property under execution thereon.
The judgment helow is
Reversed.