Tbe parties agreed in tbe stipulation filed tbat tbe questions of law presented for decision by tbe Superior Court were: (1) Did tbe defendants bave tbe right of immediate appeal to tbe Superior Court of Rockingham County upon tbe overruling of their special appearance and motion to dismiss without having first answered and before trial bad in tbe recorder’s court; and (2) if so, does tbe recorder’s court of Reidsville Township bave jurisdiction of tbe parties and tbe subject matter of tbis action either under general legislation or Public-Local Laws of North Carolina? Ch. 324, Public-Local Laws 1915; ch. 24, Public Laws 1931.
Tbe motion or demurrer challenges tbe right of tbe plaintiff to maintain bis action in tbe recorder’s court of Reidsville. Defendants bad tbe right to appeal from tbe order overruling tbe same. C. S., 509; C. S., 514; C. S., 638; Jones v. Oil Co., 202. N. C., 328, 162 S. E., 741. McIntosh P. & P., 470. An appeal having been denied, petition for writ of certiorari was tbe proper remedy. Pue v. Hood, Comr. of Banks, ante, 310.
On tbe second question defendants deny jurisdiction either of tbe person or of tbe subject matter of tbe action.
Tbe local court bad jurisdiction of tbe person of tbe defendants for two reasons: (1) there was a valid service of summons; and (2) tbe defendants made general appearance.
Tbe local court was authorized by the statute creating it to issue a summons running out of tbe county, and tbe issuance of tbe summons to another county addressed to tbe sheriff of tbat county is authorized by statute, C. S., 478 (a). Admittedly tbis summons was served on defendants.
Jurisdiction of tbe person depends on notice and tbe duty to give notice by service of a valid summons rests upon plaintiff. When jurisdiction of tbe person is challenged for tbat there was no legal service of a valid summons a motion to dismiss made on special appearance is ordinarily tbe proper method of presenting tbe question for decision. *592 Credit Corp. v. Satterfield, 218 N. C., 298, 10 S. E. (2d), 914; Lindsay v. Short, 210 N. C., 287, 186 S. E., 239; Smith v. Haughton, 206 N. C., 587, 174 S. E., 506; Suskin v. Trust Co., 213 N. C., 388, 196 S. E., 407; Bank v. Derby, 215 N. C., 669, 2 S. E. (2d), 875; Denton v. Vassiliades, 212 N. C., 513, 193 S. E., 737. A general appearance waives any defect in tbe jurisdiction of the court for want of valid summons or proper service thereof. Credit Corp. v. Satterfield, supra; Motor Co. v. Reaves, 184 N. C., 260, 114 S. E., 175; Bank v. Derby, supra.
On the other hand, objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is presented by demurrer, O. S., 511, and a demurrer is a plea to the cause of action set out in the complaint. Motor Co. v. Reaves, supra; Shaffer v. Bank, 201 N. C., 415, 160 S. E., 481; Credit Corp. v. Satterfield, supra.
A motion or demurrer which pertains to the merits of the cause or alleged deficiencies in the complaint constitutes a general appearance and subjects the movant to the jurisdiction of the court. Motor Co. v. Reaves, supra; Shaffer v. Bank, supra; Credit Corp. v. Satterfield, supra.
An objection that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action is considered in law as taken to the merits and not merely to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant and an appearance for the purpose. of entering such objection is, in fact, a general appearance which waives any defect in the jurisdiction arising either from want of service on defendants or from a defect therein. Motor Co. v. Reaves, supra; Credit Corp. v. Satterfield, supra; Gilbert v. Hall, 115 Ind., 549.
It follows that defendants are in court both by service of summons and by general appearance made when they filed their motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.
This brings us to the primary question presented for decision: Does the recorder’s court of Reidsville have jurisdiction of the cause of action set out in the complaint ?
Defendants’ challenge of this jurisdiction is bottomed upon language used in the Act first conferring on this court limited jurisdiction in civil actions. Ch. 324, Public-Local Laws 1915. The jurisdiction conferred by this Act is “in civil actions arising in said county out of contract where the sum demanded is not over $500.” Plaintiff’s cause of action did not arise in Rockingham County. Hence, the defendants argue, the local court is without jurisdiction.
Plaintiff, we understand, concedes that if the 1915 Act is controlling then the local court is without jurisdiction. He asserts, however, that ch. 24, Public Laws 1931, vested this court with general jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Superior Court over all civil actions on *593contract where the amount demanded does not exceed $1,500, unlimited by the provisions of the 1915 Act.
This Act, in section 1 (a), provides:
“In addition to the civil jurisdiction already conferred upon the Eecorder’s Court of the City of Eeidsville, the said Court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court of Eockingham County in all civil actions founded on contract wherein the sum demanded shall not exceed fifteen hundred dollars and wherein the title to real estate shall not be in controversy and other civil actions not founded on contract wherein the value of the property in controversy or the sum demanded does not exceed one thousand dollars.”
The language used is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all civil actions within the prescribed limitations without regard to whether they arose in or outside Eockingham County, subject, of course, to the provisions of the venue statute. The jurisdiction thus conferred is in addition to the civil jurisdiction then existing and is not limited by the language “arising in said county” used in the 1915 Act. If there is any conflict then the former act, to the extent of such conflict, is repealed by the 1931 statute. We are of the opinion that it clearly embraces plaintiff’s cause of action.
The enactment of this Public-Local Law is not inhibited by Art. II, sec. 29, of the Constitution. We so held in Provision Co. v. Daves, 190 N. C., 7, 128 S. E., 593. See also S. v. Horne, 191 N. C., 375, 131 S. E., 753; Deese v. Lumberton, 211 N. C., 31, 188 S. E., 857. Whether that part of the Act which extended the territorial limitations of the court is valid is not, on this record, material.
The defendants also assign as error that part of the judgment which remands the cause to the recorder’s court for trial. This assignment is without merit.
The pertinent statute provides, in effect, for trial de novo in the Superior Court in all appeals from the Eeidsville recorder’s court. Trial de novo as thus used means a retrial or a new trial in a Superior Court of a cause theretofore heard in an inferior court. There can be no trial de novo until there has first been a trial in the inferior court. This cause reached the Superior Court on a preliminary skirmish to determine the right of the local court to proceed. No issue of fact has been joined by answer. No trial has been had and no final judgment has been entered by the inferior court. Hence, there was no error in the order of remand.
All the eases cited by defendants in support of this contention relate to and discuss appeals from final judgments. They are not authoritative here.
*594That the local court is sometimes referred to as the recorder’s court of the town of Reidsville and sometimes as the recorder’s court of the city of Reidsville is not material here. It did not mislead defendants. They knew to what court they were summoned and they duly appeared. The judgment below is
Affirmed.