The first exceptive assignment of error is to the court’s striking out the defendant’s alleged defense of a parol contract existing between the original owner, Cornelia Merrick Smith, and the defendant Amelia Guión, to convey the locus in quo to her. John Stone, Jr., having received a deed for the locus in quo from the original plaintiff, Moses Grimes, during the pendency of the suit, took such title thereto as Moses Grimes possessed, and with the knowledge that the defense sought to be interposed had been adjudicated adversely to the defendant. The issue raised by the filing of this defense having been adjudicated in the former appeal, the defense was very properly stricken out when attempted to be set up a second time.
The exceptive assignments of error based upon the contention that the plaintiff has failed to show sufficient description of the land which he *550seeks to recover cannot be sustained, in view of tbe fact tbat tbe defendant in ber original, and in ber amended, answer admits tbat sbe entered into tbe possession of tbe lands described in tbe complaint and is in tbe possession of tbe same. Tbe complaint contains tbe same description as is contained in tbe deeds to wbicb these assignments of error are addressed, and refer to tbe same plat wbicb is recorded in tbe office of tbe Register of Deeds of Robeson County. Tbe defendant by reference in ber pleadings to tbe description as contained in tbe complaint wbicb is tbe same as tbe description contained in tbe deeds and plat offered in evidence admits tbat sucb description covers tbe lands wbicb are tbe subject of tbis action.
Tbe exceptive assignments of error based upon tbe admission in evidence of certain allegations contained in tbe defendant’s original answer filed in tbis cause are untenable. “ ‘Tbe declarations of parties to suits are always admissible evidence against, tbougb not for, them.’ ” Byrd v. Spruce Co., 170 N. C., 429, 87 S. E., 241.
Tbe appealing defendant’s demurrer to tbe evidence and motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit, C. S., 567, was properly overruled. Tbe plaintiff offered a chain of title to himself and bis predecessors in title from a common source from wbicb tbe defendant asserts title, namely, Cornelia Merrick Smith. Tbis chain of title consisted of a deed to John Stone, Jr., from Moses Grimes, the original plaintiff, a deed to Moses Grimes from Simon Peter Dunham and others, tbe children and tbe heirs at law of Cornelia Merrick Smith, deceased, and a deed to Cornelia Merrick Smith from L. E. Whaley and wife, all of wbicb deeds were duly recorded in tbe registry of Robeson County and contained tbe same description as tbat contained in tbe complaint, and was the same description as tbat of tbe land of which tbe defendant admits in ber answers she entered into tbe possession and remained therein. These deeds made out at least a prima facie case sufficient to be submitted to tbe jury, and, in tbe absence of any evidence to tbe contrary introduced by tbe defendant or otherwise, entitled tbe plaintiff to an instruction to tbe effect tbat if they found tbe facts to be as all of tbe evidence tended to show, or if they believed tbe evidence, they would answer tbe issues in favor of tbe plaintiff. Roberts v. Dale, 171 N. C. 466, 88 S. E., 778, and cases there cited.
If there was a conflict, and therefore error, in tbe first instruction of tbe court tbat tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff made out a prima facie case in bis favor, and the subsequent instruction to tbe jury tbat “if you believe tbe evidence and find tbe facts to be as it tends to show, I instruct you to answer tbe issue, Yes,” tbe error was harmless.
In tbe trial below we find
No error.