The Court is of the opinion that the trial judge was correct in his interpretation of the law and its application to the facts of the case.
With reference to the lands, or interest therein, which defendants acquired from their mother in 1916, since all the judgments listed were taken subsequent to that date, they have priorities in the order of their docketing. Titman v. Rhyne, 89 N. C., 64; Dillard v. Walker, 204 N. C., 67, 167 S. E., 632; Hardy v. Carr, 104 N. C., 33, 10 S. E., 128; Jones v. Currie, 190 N. C., 260, 129 S. E., 605. As to the land acquired by J. C. Jones 1 May, 1938, by devise from his father, all the judgments which have been docketed prior to that date are on a parity and must pro rate, since the liens attached simultaneously upon the death of the devisor. Linker v. Linker, 213 N. C., 351, 196 S. E., 329; Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C., 682, 125 S. E., 490. The two judgments docketed after 1 May, 1938, are entitled to be paid in their order after judgments having prior liens have been satisfied.
Since, under C. S., 614, no lien attaches to personalty by reason of the docketing of the judgment, although such a lien may be acquired by levy, the order of Judge Eousseau sustaining the prior lien of the attachment as to the personal property of J. C. Jones is correct.
The plaintiff contends that its lien under the attachment is superior to those of other judgment creditors because of the diligence it exercised beyond that of other judgment creditors in discovering that the defendants were nonresidents and not entitled to a homestead against execution, and in acting thereupon. But the principle on which the plaintiff depends ordinarily applies when such diligence has uncovered new funds to which resort may be had in satisfaction of the debt; as, for example, when an equitable lien may exist in favor of a creditor who has instituted a proceeding supplemental to execution and has uncovered property fraudulently concealed or put beyond the reach of execution. But in the case at bar, when the defendants became nonresidents, their entire real property, free of homestead exemption, became presently subject to *533execution—Constitution, Art. X, sec. 2; Taylor v. Hayes, 172 N. C., 663, 90 S. E., 801; Baher v. Legget, 98 N. C., 304—a right which inured to all the judgment creditors and which could not be affected by resort to attachment. Under chapter 359, Public Laws of 1885, a docketed judgment has a lien upon the homestead even after it has been set apart; and plaintiff brought in by its attachment nothing against which it was not the right of all the holders of docketed judgments to proceed by execution, if and when they so desired.
As expressed in 7 C. J. S., page 40, Attachment, “Where a judgment has become a lien on property of defendant, before the levy of an attachment on the same property, a judgment creditor will prevail over the attaching creditor.” That is the law in this State. Hambley v. White, 192 N. C., 31, 133 S. E., 399; Moore v. Jordan, 117 N. C., 86, 33 S. E., 259; Pasour v. Rhyne, 82 N. C., 149.
The judgment of the lower court is
Affirmed.