It appears that in the development of the testimony, in the trial, the State put in evidence the defendant’s narrative of the circumstances of the homicide, which tended to show that the fatal wound was inflicted by the defendant in the defense of himself and his home, against an attempt on the part of the deceased to enter by force with threats to kill. It was earnestly argued that this constituted a complete defense, and that this evidence having been offered by the State, without other showing, entitled the defendant to his motion for judgment of nonsuit or for a directed verdict in his favor. S. v. Fulcher, 184 N. C., 663, 113 S. E., 769; S. v. Todd, ante, 346.
However, an examination of the evidence set out in the record reveals that while the deceased was attempting to force an entrance into defendant’s home, and had gone so far as to break the back window of the house and project his head and shoulders through the aperture at the time he was shot, the State’s testimony does not show the defendant at any time ordered him to desist, or gave him any warning of his purpose to shoot if he persisted. The shades of the room were down and the presence-of the defendant and his gun apparently were not clearly observable. No word was spoken by the defendant, and, when the head of the intruder appeared through the window, he shot. It is true, where a person’s home has been violently invaded under such circumstances as to make it appear that a warning or order to desist would be ineffective to stop an apparently murderous assault, the law would not require a challenge to the assailant as a prerequisite to taking adequate measures for defense. In the expressive language of Chief Justice Pearson, “One cannot be expected to encounter a lion as he would a lamb.” S. v. Floyd, *43151 N. C., 392; S. v. Hough, 138 N. C., 663, 50 S. E., 709. But we tbink' under all tbe circumstances of tbis case, whether tbe defendant used more force tban appeared reasonably necessary for tbe protection of himself or bis home was a question for tbe jury, and that tbe motion for judgment of nonsuit was properly denied. S. v. Goode, 130 N. C., 651, 41 S. E., 3; S. v. Cox, 153 N. C., 638, 69 S. E., 419; S. v. Robinson, 188 N. C., 784, 125 S. E., 617; S. v. Glenn, 198 N. C., 79, 150 S. E., 663; S. v. Bryson, 200 N. C., 50, 156 S. E., 143; S. v. Roddey, 219 N. C., 532, 14 S. E. (2d), 526.
But we tbink tbe learned judge who presided over tbe trial of tbis ease fell into error in bis interpretation of tbe extent and effect of tbe admission of counsel. We do not tbink tbis was alone sufficient to relieve tbe State of tbe burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that tbe defendant intentionally killed tbe deceased witb a deadly weapon, or to require tbe defendant to assume the burden of satisfying tbe jury that be was justified on tbe ground of self-defense. The defendant bad pleaded not guilty. He bad not gone upon tbe stand nor made any admission other tban tbe statement of counsel. Tbis statement should not be given an interpretation beyond tbe necessary implication of tbe words used. Tbe portion of tbe charge excepted to properly could be predicated only on a definite admission, or tbe finding by tbe requisite degree of proof, that tbe defendant intentionally slew tbe deceased witb a deadly weapon, thus making out a prima facie case of murder in tbe second degree. S. v. Beachum, 220 N. C., 531, 17 S. E. (2d), 674; S. v. Howell, 218 N. C., 280, 10 S. E. (2d), 815; S. v. Quick, 150 N. C., 820, 64 S. E., 168.
We tbink tbe instruction complained of tended to relieve tbe State of the burden of proof which was placed upon it by tbe defendant’s plea of not guilty, and that a new trial should be awarded.