The first assignment of error is to the refusal of his Honor to sustain defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit. “On motion to nonsuit, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every fact and inference of fact pertaining to the issues involved which may reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” Gorham v. Ins. Co., 214 N. C., 526, 200 S. E., 5.
The evidence offered by the plaintiff was properly submitted to the jury. The evidence of the plaintiff and defendant was conflicting, but the jury adopted the plaintiff’s version as to the facts and circumstances *233under wbicb tbe policy of insurance was issued and answered tbe issues accordingly. It appears from tbe plaintiff’s evidence and now supported by tbe verdict of tbe jury, tbat tbe agent asked tbe father of tbe applicant only tbe following questions: (1) Paul Heilig’s age; (2) where be was born; (3) tbe condition of bis health; (4) married or single; (5) who was to be named beneficiary; and (6) Paul Heilig’s address. Tbe answers to other questions, if inserted by tbe agent, without tbe knowledge of tbe applicant, in tbe absence of fraud or collusion between tbe insured and tbe agent, will not vitiate tbe policy of insurance issued pursuant to tbe information contained therein. Cato v. Hospital Care Assn., 220 N. C., 479, 17 S. E. (2d), 671; Cox v. Assurance Society, 209 N. C., 778, 185 S. E., 12.
There is no suggestion or allegation tbat there was any collusion between tbe plaintiff or tbe insured and tbe agent of tbe company, or tbat tbe agent was not acting in tbe scope of bis employment when be obtained tbe application for this insurance. Therefore, tbe jury having found tbat tbe insured did not make any false representations in tbe application for tbe insurance in controversy, tbe defendant is bound by tbe contract.
In Cox v. Assurance Society, supra, this Court said: “It is a well settled principle in this jurisdiction tbat an insurance company cannot avoid liability on a policy issued by it by reason of any facts wbicb were known to it at tbe time tbe policy was delivered, and tbat any knowledge of an agent or representative, while acting in tbe scope of tbe powers entrusted to him, will, in tbe absence of fraud or collusion between tbe insured and tbe agent or representative, be imputed to tbe company, though tbe policy contains a stipulation to tbe contrary. Follette v. Accident Assn., 110 N. C., 377; Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C., 589; Short v. Ins. Co., 194 N. C., 649; Laughinghouse v. Ins. Co.,.200 N. C., 434; Colson v. Assurance Co., 207 N. C., 581; Barnes v. Assurance Society, 204 N. C., 800, and cases there cited.”
Tbe third assignment of error is to tbe refusal of tbe court to permit tbe defendant to have tbe concluding argument. Tbe judge’s decision on tbat question is final and not reviewable. Eule 6, Eules of Practice in tbe Superior Courts, 221 N. C., 574.
Tbe remaining assignments of error are without merit.
In tbe judgment of tbe court below, we find