One who keeps on his premises a domestic animal of known vicious propensity is responsible in law to another whom he has wrongfully exposed to danger of attack by such animal, and who has been injured thereby. Harris v. Fisher, 115 N. C., 318, 20 S. E., 461; Harper, The Law of Torts (1933), sec. 175; 2 Cooley, The Law of Torts (4th Ed., 1932), see. 267; 2 Am. Jur., sec. 63.
Under most authorities, injuries to persons by domestic animals whose vicious propensities are known to the keeper are classified as strict torts without reference to the principles governing negligence cases. Harper, Torts, sec. 171, p. 358; 1 Hale’s P. 0., 439, Part I, c. 33. “If notice of viciousness is present the owner of animals is liable irrespective of negligence or care on his part in keeping the animal . . .” Harper, Torts, see. 171, p. 359. Strict liability obtains under this doctrine although the invasion of interest is unintended and nonnegligent. But we do not wish to become involved in a doctrinal discussion of distinctions which may lose their aptness according to the circumstances of the particular case when not involved on the record before us. Hence, we need not now discuss or decide the extent to which this doctrine is applied in this State. See Banks v. Maxwell, 205 N. C., 233, 171 S. E., 70; and Rector v. Coal Co., 192 N. C., 804, 136 S. E., 113. In the instant case a distinction may be drawn from the fact that the animal *488was under proper confinement and plaintiff was sent into the enclosure and exposed to tbe danger by defendants’ servant in charge.
The great and affectionately remembered Brogden, in bis classic opinion in Banks v. Maxwell, supra, lays down the requisites establishing liability as follows: “. . . a person injured by a domestic animal, in order to recover damages, must show two essential facts: (1) ‘The animal inflicting the injury must be dangerous, vicious, mischievous or ferocious, or one termed in law as possessing a vicious propensity.’ (2) ‘The owner must have actual or constructive knowledge of the vicious propensity, character and habits of the animal.’ ” Applicable to the case at bar, we may add that the injury must have been brought about by the breach of some duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant. Lander v. Shannon, et ux., 148 Wash., 93, 268 Pac., 145.
In Judge Brogden’s opinion our attention is called to the fact that in cases like this the conditions of liability remain substantially as they were under the Mosaic law; it must be made known to the owner that the bull was “wont to push with his horn in time past.” We may take it that the bull, after these trivial four thousand years, is much the same. But the product of artificial bodies like courts is not stabilized by ancestral genes, and the law has undergone some refinements which the able argument of counsel for defense compel us to notice. They relate to the development of plaintiff’s case in the lower court.
Defendants have excepted to the admission of evidence relating to the animal’s reputation. It is true that such evidence is generally held incompetent to show, directly, the vicious propensity. Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky., 361, 128 S. W. (2d), 564; 3 C. J. S., Animals, sec. 175, p. 1276; 2 Am. Jur., Animals, sec. 82. It is nevertheless competent and admissible in two aspects: to show scienter or knowledge thereof on the part of the owner or keeper; and to corroborate the testimony of those who have sworn to the fact of viciousness. McCullar v. Williams, 217 Ala., 278, 116 So., 137; Davis v. Mene, 52 Cal. App., 368, 198 Pac., 840; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed., 1940), sec. 251, and see also 5 Wigmore, op. cit., sec. 1621, and eases cited; 3 C. J. S., Animals, sec. 175, p. 1277.
Standing on Banks v. Maxwell, supra, and the interpretation of bovine conduct there presented, the defendants point out that there is no evidence the Moseley bull ever injured anyone by a “push with his horn” or otherwise. This would seem to be a valid argument under early cases, in which that doctrine is expressed in the statement “that every dog is entitled to one bite” or “one worry.” Harper, Torts, sec. 172, p. 361. But the doctrine no longer obtains; Fowler v. Helck, supra; Restatement, Torts (1938), sec. 509, comment g. — certainly not in this State. Banks v. Maxwell, supra; Cockerham v. Nixon, 33 N. C., 269. Under the modern view trial courts undertake to judge of the vicious *489propensities of animals by tbeir behavior, although it may fall short of actual injury. 2 Cooley, Torts (4th Ed., 1932), sec. 266, p. 54, and cases cited. Under that rule we can scarcely put it to the credit of the Moseley bull that prompt coordination of presence of mind and absence of body sometimes saved his keeper from disaster, or that, on separate occasions, the timely intervention of a bulldog, pitchfork, and shotgun saved his record from graver demerit. Those who knew him best feared him most. Where he held court, his human acquaintances made no plea to the jurisdiction, but promptly sought a change of venue.
The evidence of vicious propensity must be unequivocal. But we are not required to explore the psychology of the bull — if he has any — to determine whether his intentions are amiable or malicious. The propensity is vicious if it tends to harm, whether manifested in play or in anger, or in some outbreak of untrained nature which, from want of better understanding, must remain unclassified. 2 Am. Jur., Animals, see. 48, p. 730. Counsel for plaintiff insists the evidence tends to show that the Moseley bull, on occasion, went somewhat beyond the legitimate expression of buoyancy accorded to his kind as normal and innocent in the former opinion of the Court. With this we are inclined to agree.
Careful examination of the evidence in detail seems to indicate that all the essentials to establish liability on the part of the defendants are present. The weight to he given the evidence was a matter for the jury.