This appeal presents one question: Should the trial court have allowed defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit ?
The injury to plaintiff occurred in the State of South Carolina from causes operating in that State, and, except for procedural law of the forum not here challenged, the South Carolina law applies. Howard v. Howard, 200 N. C., 574, 158 S. E., 101; Hipps v. R. R., 177 N. C., 472, 99 S. E. (S. C.), 18.
The vast development of travel and traffic by motor vehicles, greatly multiplying the dangers incident to the use of highways and streets, and the necessity of regulation looking to the safety of persons and property, have given rise to an astonishing volume of statutory law, all of which exhibits a sameness of trend but no uniformity of detail in the several states. These statutes frequently impose duties and create obligations unknown to the common law, but there are certain fundamentals of the common law relating to actionable negligence which may be said to persist and frequently to become deciding factors after giving applicable statutes their full effect.
The rule of “the ordinarily prudent man” as a measure of the duty one person owes to another, the violation of which gives rise to actionable tort, is fully recognized in South Carolina law, as indeed it is, with some differences of local interpretation and application, in every state in the Union. Burnette v. Augusta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S. C., 359, 154 S. E., 645; Anderson v. Ballenger, 166 S. C., 44, 164 S. E., 313; Barkshadt v. Gresham, 120 S. C., 219, 112 S. E., 923; King v. Holliday, 116 S. C., 463, 108 S. E., 186. The principle is so strongly adhered to that it has been held that it is the duty.of a person technically to violate *687a statute or ordinance if to do so becomes necessary to avoid inflicting injury. Walker v. Lee, 115 S. C., 495, 106 S. E., 682; Sims v. Eleazer, 116 S. C., 41, 106 S. E., 854.
There is in the South Carolina laws introduced in the evidence an express, and we think, successful attempt to preserve this rule against purely mechanical reliance on the regulating statutes relating to the conduct of those approaching and using intersections where want of care is likely to result in injury.
While the testimony is conflicting, it can hardly be questioned that there is evidence from which the jury might infer negligence on the part of Elrod, the driver of defendant’s taxicab, in approaching and entering the intersection at a speed inconsistent with due care; especially in view of the condition of traffic therein, the fact that it was a much used intersection, and that his view was partly obstructed by a large van partly within the intersection.
As we understand the argument of defendant, it is based more strongly on the contention that the evidence fails to show that any negligence of the defendant was proximately connected with the collision and injury. Counsel contend that the negligence of Crane, the driver of the Chevrolet truck, intervened and insulated the negligence of the taxicab driver, if such negligence existed, and that we should so find as a matter of law, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, and cite numerous cases, mostly from this jurisdiction. Butner v. Spease, 217 N. C., 82, 6 S. E. (2d), 808; Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N. C., 51, 158 S. E., 840; Guthrie v. Gocking, 214 N. C., 513, 199 S. E., 707; Hinnant v. R. R., 202 N. C., 489, 163 S. E., 555; Lineberry v. R. R., 187 N. C., 786, 123 S. E., 1; Beach v. Patton, 208 N. C., 134, 179 S. E., 446, and other cases dealing with the subject. The citations considered of sufficient pertinency will be dealt with later.
If the defendant could base its theory of insulated negligence on clear and undisputed facts, showing the conduct of Crane, the driver of the Chevrolet truck, to have been of the character which defendant ascribes to it, the defense might be worthy of more serious consideration, but there are difficulties in the way. Under the conflicting evidence upon the critical point at issue, we do not feel justified in taking the extreme view of the occurrence necessary to sustain defendant’s contention. It would involve an assumption of facts which the jury, on the whole evidence, has obviously found to be otherwise.
Indeed, we are unable to see how, as a matter of law, we might find that Crane, the driver of the Chevrolet truck, was negligent at all. It has not been called to our attention that he violated any South Carolina law that would render his conduct negligent per se. On the contrary, he had a right to make .a left-hand turn into River Street through this *688intersection which, operating from his line of travel on the right-hand side of the street, would carry him across the line of traffic going south on the west side of the street. In doing this, he must, of course, observe due care; but if his testimony is believed, he did everything the law required, not only to make his attempt lawful, but to give him the right of way. See “Section 20,” supra. He signaled in apt time for a left turn, which gave him the right of way over vehicles not yet within the intersection, and then proceeded to make the turn in low gear. There was not apparent any “immediate hazard” of.oncoming cars, since traffic had stopped upon his signal — except that the taxicab alone, with undiminished speed, entered the intersection and intercepted his truck. There are contradictions, of course, but that aspect of the evidence cannot be eliminated.
There is also contradiction of the defendant’s view of the situation as to the time and manner in which Crane entered the intersection and made the turn, and the correlation of these elements with the movements of the taxicab.
Rut conceding Crane’s negligence, his conduct lacked that extraordi-nariness necessary to withdraw it from the limits of foreseeability. Restatement of the Law, Torts, section 447. To incur liability for negligent conduct, it is not necessary that the person guilty of the negligence should foresee the exact nature of the occurrence or injury consequent upon his negligent act or omission. It is only necessary that he may foresee that some injury may reasonably follow as a consequence thereof. The negligence charged to defendant’s agent, Elrod, is of a nature peculiarly significant of the obvious danger, which, in this instance, ripened into injury: — driving at a high rate of speed into a busy intersection occupied with traffic, with his vision partly obstructed. Under such circumstances it is usually seen that one who outruns his visual limitations has made a blind date with disaster. In what form it presents itself is immaterial to the issue.
The law upon the subject in this State has been expressed by Justice Barnhill in Dunn v. Bomberger, 213 N. C., 172, 177, 195 S. E., 364, as follows: “In order to establish actionable negligence the plaintiff must show that the defendant, in the exercise of ordinary care, could .foresee that some injury would result from his alleged negligent act.”
South Carolina decisions are even stronger: “The liability of a person charged with negligence does not depend on the question whether with the exercise of reasonable prudence, he could or ought to have foreseen the very injury complained of; but he may be held liable for anything which, after the injury is complete, appears to have been a natural and probable consequence of his act or omission.” Washburn v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 202 Mo. App., 102, loe. cit. 115, 214 S. W., 410, 414, approved *689in Horne v. Southern R., 186 S. C., 525, 197 S. E., 31, and in Tobias v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 190 S. C., 181, 186. “It is sufficient that in view of all the attendant circumstances, he should have foreseen that his negligence would probably result in injury of some kind to someone.” Tobias v. Carolina Power & Light Co. (S. C.), supra; Eestatement of the Law of Torts, Yol. 2, Negligence, p. 1173, section 435.
The situation dealt with in Butner v. Spease, supra, is so radically different from that presented in the present case as to distinguish the Butner v. Spease case in principle and to make it inapplicable here. Here we are dealing with the conduct of two drivers approaching, entering, and using a much used intersection in a populous town then occupied with traffic and with special, local, or state laws relating to the use of the intersection, and specifically the manner in which left-hand turns might be made and respected under the conditions then prevailing.
It should be said also that in Beach v. Patton, supra, Justice Schench, who wrote the opinion for the Court, was dealing with a passive or inactive primary negligence which lends itself more readily to the doctrine of insulated negligence when active negligence has intervened. Instances in which active negligence, continuing to the moment of the impact, may be insulated by intervening negligence must be comparatively rare. Such primary negligence is never insulated when it is obviously a substantial contributing factor. No doctrine of whatsoever kind ought to be mechanically applied against the reason of the thing.
While the jury, if the issue had been before it, might have inferred from the evidence that Crane was negligent, the ultimate effect could have been no more than make him a joint tort-feasor with the defendant, and this, of course, would not alter the result of the trial.
We find
No error.