It is conceded by the parties that the liability, if any, of defendant National Linen Service Corporation for injury to plaintiff proximately caused by the negligence of its servant or employee, the defendant Louis A. Carter is grounded solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The question then arises as to whether the evidence in the case, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient to make out a prima facie case on the essential facts necessary under that doctrine to hold *460defendant National Linen Service Corporation responsible for the negligent acts of defendant Carter. Careful consideration of the evidence in that aspect leads to a negative conclusion.
This doctrine applies only when the relation of master and servant, employer and employee, or principal and agent, is shown “to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of the wrong at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose,” Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C., 95, 77 S. E., 1096; Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N. C., 720, 150 S. E., 501; Liverman v. Cline, 212 N. C., 43, 192 S. E., 849; Tribble v. Swinson, 213 N. C., 550, 196 S. E., 820; Parrott v. Kantor, 216 N. C., 584, 6 S. E. (2d), 40; McLamb v. Beasley, 218 N. C., 308, 11 S. E. (2d), 283, and numerous other cases.
In Martin v. Bus Line, supra, this Court said: “It is elementary law that the master is responsible for the negligence of his servant which results in injury to a third person when the servant is acting within the scope of his employment and about the master’s business. Roberts v. R. R., 143 N. C., 176, 55 S. E.,509, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.), 798, 60 Ann. Cas., 375. It is equally elementary that the master is not responsible if the negligence of the servant which caused the injury occurred while the servant was engaged in some private matter of his own, or outside the legitimate scope of his employment. Bucken v. R. R., 157 N. C., 443, 73 S. E., 137; Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L., 754.” See, also, Parrott v. Kantor, supra.
“A servant is acting in the course of his employment when he is engaged in that which he is employed to do, and is at the time about his master’s business. He is not acting in the course of his employment if he is engaged in some pursuit of his own. Not every deviation from the strict execution of his duty is such an interruption of the course of employment as to suspend the master’s responsibility, but, if there is a total departure from the course of the master’s business, the master is not answerable for the servant’s conduct.” Tiffany on Agency, p. 270; Robertson v. Power Co., 204 N. C., 359, 168 S. E., 415; Parrott v. Kantor, supra.
Applying these principles to the factual situation of the present case, plaintiff has failed to offer evidence tending to show that the relation of master and servant, of employer and employee, or of principal and agent, existed between defendant Carter and National Linen Service Corporation at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury to plaintiff arose. There is no evidence that at that time Carter was acting within the scope of his employment and about the business of the Linen Corporation. On the contrary, the uncontra-dicted testimony of Carter, as witness for plaintiff, is that at the time *461of tbe accident be bad loaded and left tbe loaded truck of tbe corporation in front of tbe plant, and was riding in bis own automobile on bis way to bis borne for breakfast, and further, tbat be bas never delivered any goods of tbe company in bis car. As was said in McLamb v. Beasley, supra, Carter “was bis own master Avbile driving borne.” Tbis defeats recovery on tbe theory of respondeat superior. Parrott v. Kantor, supra.
Therefore, tbe judgment below is
Reversed.