In presenting its appeal, the defendant makes the following formal concession: “Defendant concedes that under the former opinion of the Supreme Court in this case there was evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict on all the issues except the sixth issue, ‘Was the action barred by the statute of limitations?’ And defendant further concedes that there was evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict on the sixth issue with respect to the mental incapacity of R. L. Johnson himself, but defendant contends that the statute began to run against Daniel L. Johnson, as guardian of R. L. Johnson, more than three years before action was begun.”
This narrows our consideration to a single point: Was the evidence upon the question of the discovery by the guardian of the facts constituting fraud such as to entitle the defendant to a judgment of nonsuit on the issue of the statute of limitations ?
This same question, among others, was considered on the former appeal, reported in 217 N. C., 139, and decided against the defendant. The rationale of the decision on this point was that while the failure of the guardian to sue in apt time was the failure of the ward, entailing the same legal consequences with respect to the bar of the statute of limitations (Culp v. Lee, 109 N. C., 675, 14 S. E., 74), in cases of fraud *205the statute would not begin to run until tbe discovery of the fraud or knowledge of circumstances which would put the person claiming the right to sue on inquiry; and it was held that on this point the evidence then appearing in the record was sufficient to carry the case to the jury.
The statute, C. S., 441 (9), prescribes that in actions based on fraud “the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” This has been interpreted to mean that the statute would not begin to run “until the impeaching facts were known or should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable business prudence” (Ewbank v. Lyman, 170 N. C., 505, 87 S. E., 348), or should have been discovered “in the exercise of ordinary prudence” (Peacock v. Barnes, 142 N. C., 215, 55 S. E., 99). Sanderlin v. Cross, 172 N. C., 234, 90 S. E., 213; Latham v. Latham, 184 N. C., 55, 113 S. E., 623.
The evidence on this point adduced at the last trial, compared with that offered on the former trial, which was held sufficient to carry the case to the jury, does not reveal such substantial difference as would justify the reversal of our former ruling. The evidence clearly presented contradictions which it was the exclusive province of the jury to settle. The court fully and correctly charged the jury as to the law applicable to all the testimony on the point which appellant now presses. The jury determined the issues of fact against the defendant. No sufficient ground has been shown which would warrant us in disturbing the result.
The action of the court below in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of nonsuit, and in declining to give the peremptory instructions prayed for must be upheld. Haywood v. Ins. Co., 218 N. C., 736.
In the trial we find
No error.
BarNhill, J., not sitting.