The first contention made by defendant: Does the warrant charge a crime under the statute? We think so.
The defendant was indicted under the provisions of N. C. Code, 1939 (Michie), section 2621 (287): “Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving, and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in section 2621 (326).”
In a warrant or indictment the better rule is to follow the language of the statute. S. v. Abbott, ante, 470 (476). If the warrant or indictment charges substantially the crime it is sufficient — as we think it does in this case.
Section 4613: “In all indictments when further information not required to be set out therein is desirable for the better defense of the accused, the court, upon motion, may, in its discretion, require the solicitor to furnish a bill of particulars of such matters.” A bill of particulars will not supply any matter required to be charged in the indictment, as an ingredient of the offense. S. v. Stephens, 170 N. C., 745 (747), 87 S. E., 131.
Section 4623: “Every criminal proceeding by warrant, indictment, information or impeachment is sufficient in form for all intents and purposes if it express the charge against the defendant in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner; and the same shall not be quashed, nor the judgment thereon stayed, by reason of any informality or refinement, if *773in the bill or proceeding, sufficient matter appears to enable the court to proceed to judgment.” See section 4625.
In S. v. Sarnia, ante, 307, we find: “In this Court defendant entered a motion in arrest of the judgment on the ground that the case was transferred from the Craven County recorder’s court to the Superior Court for trial, and that defendant was there tried upon the original warrant without a bill of indictment. This procedure was authorized by statute, Public Laws 1929, ch. 115, sec. 2, and has been upheld by this Court in S. v. Publishing Co., 179 N. C., 720, 102 S. E., 318; S. v. Saleeby, 183 N. C., 740, 110 S. E., 844. See, also, S. v. Boykin, 211 N. C., 407, 191 S. E., 18.”
The modern tendency is against technical objections which do not affect the merits of the case. Hence, judgments are not to be stayed or reversed for nonessential or minor defects. S. v. Anderson, 208 N. C., 771 (782).
In 22 C. J. S., part see. 575, p. 549, is the following: “A complaint which charges the violation of the statutes of the state, and states an offense under a particular statute, has been upheld notwithstanding it also charges a violation of a specific municipal ordinance which is void. It has even been held that, if the acts alleged constitute an offense, under a particular law, an allegation that they are a violation of another law may be disregarded as immaterial.”
The second contention made by defendant is: That the court below was in error when it overruled defendant’s motion made (N. C. Code, 1939 [Michie], sec. 4643) for judgment of nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. We cannot so hold.
The evidence on the part of the State is to the effect that Browning was driving his automobile on the right-hand side of the road at 20 to 25 miles an hour, and defendant struck his car, running 60 miles an hour, in the rear, before Browning could get on the shoulders, he having seen defendant coming at a fast rate of speed through his rear-view mirror. The impact was so great that the Browning car “was turned over in a ditch with the front headed toward Chapel Hill,” and the collision was heard 300 feet away.
We think the evidence shows, and it was a question for the jury to determine under the statute, that the automobile was being operated by the defendant upon the highway “carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property.” S. v. Huggins, 214 N. C., 568.
The charge of the court below is not in the record and the presumption is that the charge covered every aspect of the law applicable to the *774facts. Tbe record discloses that “The court stated in a plain and correct manner the evidence in the case, the contentions of the State and the defendant arising thereon, and declared and explained the law arising thereon.” The jury, under the charge of the court below, which the record presumes contained every ingredient of the crime, convicted defendant of “Reckless driving.”
The defendant contends that arrest of judgment should be allowed. We cannot so hold. In S. v. Epps, 213 N. C., 709 (717), it is said: “The indictment is not fatally defective and defendant’s motion for arrest of judgment is without merit. S. v. Efird, 186 N. C., 482; S. v. Callett, 211 N. C., 563.”
The last contention made by defendant: “That the sentence imposed was excessive in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant.” We cannot so hold.
Section 2621 (287) of N. C. Code, 1939 (Michie), provides that a person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished as provided in section 2621 (326). This section is as follows: “Every person convicted of reckless driving under section 2621 (287) shall be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for a period of not more than six months or by fine of not more than five hundred ($500) dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and on a second or subsequent conviction of such offense shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine of not less than fifty ($50) dollars nor more than one thousand ($1,000) dollars, or by both such fine and impris onment. ”
The court below did not exceed the limit of the statute. Within the limit of the statute the court is given the discretion to fix the punishment. We see no abuse of the discretion. As said in S. v. Swindell, 189 N. C., 151 (155): “Though the punishment is great, the protection due to society is greater. The hope is to amend the offender, to deprive him of the opportunity to do future mischief, and, above all, an example to deter others.”
For the reasons given, we find
No error.