The substituted plaintiff’s exceptions and assignments of error are: “(1) For that the court erred in refusing to enter judg*255ment in favor of the substituted plaintiff upon the pleadings, exhibits and the admissions of counsel. (2) For that the court erred in entering a judgment as set out in the record.” We think these exceptions and assignments of error cannot be sustained.
The land in controversy was willed in fee simple by Isaac W. Jones, Sr., to his daughter, Martha Ann Elizabeth Barnes. Martha Ann Elizabeth Barnes intermarried with Charles L. Barnes, and there were two children born of the marriage, viz.: (1) The plaintiff, Mary Madge Barnes, who intermarried with one Shoemaker, now deceased, and sold her interest to Allen Moye, substituted plaintiff, and (2) the defendant, Lillie Barnes, who intermarried with G. II. Coats.
Martha Ann Elizabeth Barnes (will signed Bettie J. Barnes) died on 3 February, 1932, leaving her surviving her husband, Charles L. Barnes, and their two children before mentioned: Mary Madge Barnes Shoemaker and Lillie Barnes Coats.
The said Charles L. Barnes died testate on 4 May, 1938, leaving him surviving the said two children, Mary Madge Barnes Shoemaker and Lillie Barnes Coats.
The last will and testament of the said Charles L. Barnes was dated on 3 August, 1920 (being the same date as the date of the will of his deceased wife, Bettie J. Barnes). The original plaintiff herein, Mary Madge Barnes Shoemaker, duly executed and delivered to Allen Moye a deed dated 30 December, 1939, which was duly recorded, which deed is sufficient in form to convey any and all interest in the lands described in said deed, which was owned by the grantor.
(1) This appeal involves the construction of two wills, each containing similar language, and it presents this question: Did Charles L. Barnes take a life estate under Item 2 of the will of Bettie J. Barnes? We think so.
In Items 2, 3 and 4 of Bettie J. Barnes’ will is the following :
“Second. I give and devise to my beloved husband, Chas. L. Barnes, in fee simple, my entire estate as long as he lives, he to use only the rents and interest which may accrue on said estate.
“Third: At my beloved husband’s death, I give and devise to my beloved daughter, Mary Madge Barnes, Five ($5.00) Dollars to be paid by my executor within two years.
“Fourth: At my beloved husband’s death, I give and devise to my beloved daughter, Lillie L. Coats, wife of G. H. Coats, the balance of my estate, to be paid by my executor within two years.”
In Williamson v. Cox, ante, 177, the rule as to the construction of wills is thus stated by Devin, J., for the Court: “The cardinal principle in the interpretation of wills is that the intention of the testator as expressed in the language of the instrument shall prevail, and that the *256application of technical rules will not be permitted to defeat an intention which substantially appears from the entire instrument. Heyer v. Bulluck, 210 N. C., 321, 186 S. E., 356; Smith v. Mears, post, 193. However, accepted canons of construction which have become settled rules of law and property cannot be disregarded. As was said in May v. Lewis, 132 N. C., 115, 43 S. E., 550: It is our duty, as far as possible, to give the words used by a testator their legal significance, unless it is apparent from the will itself that they were used in some other sensei 4 Kent’s Com., 231.”
We think it clearly appears that the words “in fee simple,” in Item 2, were not used in their legal or technical sense, for immediately after them is the following, “My entire estate as long as he lives" then further, “he to use only the rents and interest which may accrue on said estate.” Also to be noted in Item 3 and 4 is the language “at my beloved husband’s death,” showing only a life estate was given.
(2) If Charles L. Barnes took a life estate under Item 2 of the will, did Lillie Coats, the defendant, appellee, take a fee simple under Item 4 of this will? We think so.
Charles L. Barnes, having taken a life estate under Item 2, Item 4, we think, in clear language gives to Lillie (Barnes) Coats, the defendant, “the balance of my estate
Black’s Law Dictionary (3rd Ed., p. 682) defines “Estate”: “The interest which anyone has in lands, or in any other subject of property . . . (citing authorities). An estate in lands, tenements and here-ditaments signifies such interest as the tenant has therein. 2 Bl. Comm., 103.” The degree, quantity, nature and extent of interest which a person has in real property is usually referred to as an estate, and it varies from absolute ownership down to naked possession. Nicholson Corp. v. Ferguson, 243 P., 195, 200, 114 Okla., 10. Black, supra.
(3) From our construction of the will of Bettie J. Barnes, we think the land in controversy went to Lillie Barnes Coats, the defendant. But, if Charles L. Barnes took a fee simple under Item 2 of the will of Bettie J. Barnes, did Lillie Barnes Coats, the defendant, appellee, take a fee simple under Item 4 of the will of Charles L. Barnes? We think so.
In Item 4 of Charles L. Barnes’ will is the following: “ ‘Fourth,’ at my beloved wife’s death I give and devise to my beloved daughter Lillie L. (Barnes) Coats, wife of Gr. H. Coats, the balance of my estate to be paid by my executor within two years.”
We think the language is clear. The third item in both wills only gave five ($5.00) dollars to Mary Madge Barnes (now Shoemaker), and her assignee, Allen Moye, substituted plaintiff, from the construction we place on the will, has no interest in the land in controversy.
*257We think the ease of Barco v. Owens, 212 N. C., 30, easily distinguishable from the present action. Having construed Item 2 to give only a life estate, the case of McDaniel v. McDaniel, 58 N. C., 351, and like cases are not applicable. For the reasons given, the judgment of the court below is