At the close of plaintiff’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence, the defendant in the general county court for Buncombe County, made motions for judgment as in case of nonsuit. O. S., 567. The court overruled these motions and on appeal to the Superior Court the rulings were sustained. In this we can see no error. The often repeated rule is that the evidence which makes for plaintiff’s claim, or tends to support his cause of action, on a motion to nonsuit, is to be taken in its most favorable light for the plaintiff, and he is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment upon the evidence, and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.
*127Tbis Court bas nothing to do witb tbe findings of fact by tbe jury and on appeal defendant’s evidence is not to be considered.
N. C. Const., Art. IV, sec. 8: “Tbe Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal,’ any decision of tbe courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference,” etc. On appeal to tbe Supreme Court, only error as to tbe la-w or legal inference are reviewable upon tbe record in tbe case. Bank v. Howard, 188 N. C., 543. Tbe competency, admissibility and sufficiency of tbe evidence is for tbe court, tbe weight, effect and credibility is for tbe jury, and on appeal tbe Supreme Court can review only matters of law or legal inference. S. v. Casey, 201 N. C., 185; Debnam v. Rouse, 201 N. C., 459; Carter v. Mullinax, 201 N. C., 783; Bakery v. Ins. Co., 201 N. C., 816; S. v. Harrell, 203 N. C., 210; S. v. Whiteside, 204 N. C., 710.
Tbe only question we now have to consider: Was there any prejudicial or reversible error on tbe exclusion of certain evidence and charge of tbe court? We think not.
Tbe evidence tended to show that plaintiff was driving bis car on tbe right side of a State Highway, open and carrying normal traffic. Tbe defendant’s truck was hauling gravel to be spread on tbe road across tbe mountain 5 or 6 miles from where tbe wreck occurred and tbe truck was on tbe left-hand side of tbe road, square over on tbe left-hand side witb tbe wheels in a rut on said side. Defendant’s truck struck plaintiff’s car and seriously injured him. Tbe plaintiff received permanent. injuries, having both jawbones broken, cuts in chin and over an eye. He was operated on three times and is now suffering from permanent injuries, embracing a partial paralysis of the- face, and is restricted in opening bis mouth from % to % of an inch less than an average male. Tbe plaintiff’s car was in good condition, witb good tires, brakes and born. He was going south around a curve, running about 15 miles an hour, sounding bis born, and on tbe right-hand side of tbe road. Tbe defendant’s truck was coming up tbe road on tbe left-hand side of tbe road, square over on tbe left-hand side witb tbe wheels in tbe rut on said side, right in tbe face of plaintiff’s car. Tbe rear end of defendant’s truck struck plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff was on tbe right side of tbe road, defendant’s truck was on tbe wrong side. Plaintiff was permanently injured.
In Hancock v. Wilson, 211 N. C., 129 (134), we find: “When tbe driver of one of tbe automobiles is not observing tbe rule of tbis section (Laws 1927, cb. 148, sec. 11), as tbe automobiles approach each other, tbe other may assume that before tbe automobiles meet, tbe driver of tbe approaching automobile will turn to bis right, so that tbe two automobiles may pass each other in safety.”
*128Certain assignments of error made by defendant cannot be sustained. The evidence sought to be admitted was with reference to the speed of the plaintiff’s car 3 or 4 miles away, at a time varying from 15 to 45 minutes from the hour of the accident, the witness would have testified that plaintiff’s speed was approximately 40 miles an hour. No evidence was offered or attempted to be offered which showed conditions on the highway at that place. The evidence as to speed 3 or 4 miles at 5 :00 o’clock, when the wreck occurred some time between 5 :00 and 5 :30, and that the speed at that distance and time was 45 miles an hour. By the same witness appellee (defendant) undertook to show that he had seen plaintiff on other occasions operating his car dangerously and recklessly and fast. ¥e do not think this evidence of any probative force. It is merely surmise and guess. The competent evidence as to the collision was the speed of the automobile at or about the time of the collision. The driving at other places is too remote. The cases of Hicks v. Love, 201 N. C., 773, and Charnock v. Refrigerating Co., 202 N. C., 105, are not contrary. There are a great many circumstances to be considered as to prior speed. “If immediately before the collision,” as in the Hides case, supra, it is competent.
The judge of the general county court charged the jury: “Now, gentlemen of the jury, in order to establish actionable negligence, the plaintiff is required to satisfy you, first, that the defendant has failed to exercise due care in the performance of some legal duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff under the circumstances in which they were placed, and, second, that such failure on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the collision. Due care is the care which a person of ordinary prudence should use under the same or similar circumstances when charged with a like duty; the failure to exercise due care when it becomes the proximate cause of a collision or injury, if such failure was negligence, then if it becomes the proximate cause of the collision, it becomes actionable negligence.”
The court then gave a correct charge taken as a whole as to the meaning of proximate cause. This exception and assignment of error cannot be sustained. The court charged: “The law requires that every person operating an automobile on the public highways shall operate it in a manner which is prudent and reasonable under the circumstances and in the light of the attending circumstances, both as to speed and the manner of operation. Defendant owed the plaintiff the duty on this occasion to exercise due care in operating his automobile in a manner which was prudent and reasonable in the light of the attending circumstances. Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right, each giving to the other at least one-half of the *129main traveled portion of tbe right of way as nearly as possible, so defendant owed tbe plaintiff tbe duty to drive its truck on tbe rigbt-band side of tbe road and to yield to tbe plaintiff at least one-balf of tbe main traveled portion of tbe bigbway.” Tbe charge continues, giving tbe rule of law in road cases applicable to tbe facts in this case. Another exception and assignment of error was made to tbe charge which upon careful reading was in tbe nature of a contention. If inaccurate, tbe attention of tbe court should have been called to it. We see nothing prejudicial in tbe charge. In fact, in some 15 pages, to which no exception was taken, tbe court placed tbe burden of tbe issues properly, defined correctly greater weight of tbe evidence, negligence, contributory negligence and damage; giving tbe contentions pro and con of tbe litigants in.a fair and impartial way.
Tbe court did not impinge C. S., 564; it charged every substantial and essential feature of tbe case.
We have examined all tbe exceptions and assignments of error with care, and see no error.
In Davis v. Long, 189 N. C., 129 (137), it is written: “Tbe case is not complicated as to tbe law or facts. Tbe jurors are presumed to be men of 'good moral character and sufficient intelligence.’ They could easily understand tbe law as applied to tbe facts. Tbe jury has found all tbe issues in favor of plaintiff, and we find no error.”
For tbe reasons given, tbe judgment of tbe court below is
BaeNHill, J., dissents.