Section 1743 of tbe Consolidated Statutes of 1919, under which plaintiffs are proceeding, provides tbat an action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property adverse to him for tbe purpose of determining sucb adverse claim. “Tbe law . . . was designed and intended to afford a remedy wherever one owns or has an estate or interest in real property, whether be is in or out of possession, and another wrongfully sets up a claim to an estate or interest therein which purports to affect adversely tbe estate or interest of tbe true owner and which is reasonably calculated to burden and embarrass sucb owner in tbe full and proper enjoyment of bis proprietary rights, including tbe right to dispose of tbe same at its fair market value.” Hoke, J., in Satterwhite v. Gallagher, 173 N. C., 525, 92 S. E., 369.
Applying this as tbe test, do tbe allegations of fact in tbe complaint, when admitted to be true for tbe purpose of passing upon tbe demurrer, state a cause of action in behalf of tbe plaintiffs and against tbe defendant, Lois Rutb Eisber ? Tbe correctness of tbe ruling of tbe court below upon tbe demurrer of defendant, Lois Rutb Fisber, which challenges tbe sufficiency of such allegations, is tbe only question properly determinable *75on tbis appeal. We are of opinion and bold that tbe demurrer was properly overruled.
As tbe question now presented only involves a matter of pleading, we will consider only sucb of tbe allegations of fact, admitted for tbe purpose, as will determine tbe sufficiency of tbe complaint to state a cause of action.
It is sufficient to consider tbis question only: Is tbe deed from W. Homer Fisber and wife, Oleo M. Fisber, to Sydnor DeButts, Trustee, for tbe use and benefit of W. Homer Fisber, void because tbe certificate of tbe clerk before whom tbe deed was acknowledged fails to comply with tbe provisions of C. S., 2515?
Tbis Court has uniformly held that tbe deed of a wife, conveying land to her husband, is void unless tbe probating officer in bis certificate of probate certify that, at tbe time of its execution and her privy examination, tbe deed is not “unreasonable or injurious” to her. Wallin v. Rice, 170 N. C., 417, 87 S. E., 239; Foster v. Williams, 182 N. C., 632, 109 S. E., 834; Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C., 200, 124 S. E., 566; Best v. Utley, 189 N. C., 356, 127 S. E., 337; Garner v. Horner, 191 N. C., 539, 132 S. E., 290; Caldwell v. Blount, 193 N. C., 560, 137 S. E., 578; Capps v. Massey, 199 N. C., 196, 154 S. E., 52; Bank v. McCullers, 201 N. C., 440, 160 S. E., 494, and numerous other cases.
Tbe principle applies to deed by husband and wife to a trustee for tbe use and benefit of tbe husband conveying lands held by them as tenants by tbe entirety. Davis v. Bass, supra; Best v. Utley, supra; Garner v. Horner, supra. While these general principles of law are not controverted, tbe defendant contends that tbe deed to tbe trustee is covered by tbe certificate to tbe deed of separation, which is in conformity with tbe statute. It is argued that from an examination of tbe deed of separation it is manifest that at tbe time of its execution Fisber and bis wife bad agreed upon a complete settlement of all their property rights; that tbe deed to tbe trustee was an essential part of tbe property settlement; and that, hence, it must have been passed upon by tbe clerk and included in bis certificate to tbe deed of separation, thereby making a separate certificate under C. S., 2515, unnecessary for tbe deed to tbe trustee. In tbis connection, it is pertinent to note that tbe deed of separation appears to bear date five days previous to that of tbe deed to tbe trustee, and to have been acknowledged one day before tbe deed to tbe trustee was acknowledged. It is further noteworthy and significant that while in tbe premises in tbe deed of separation it is recited that “tbe parties have agreed among themselves as to ... a settlement of all property rights,” tbe agreement makes no reference to property held by them as tenants by tbe entirety, and is limited in so far as real estate is concerned, to that “which she may now own or hereafter acquire,” and to “that which be may now own or hereafter acquire.”
*76Careful examination fails to reveal any indicia in tie deed of separation tiat tie deed to tie trustee siould be executed as a part of tie separation agreement, nor is there in tie deed to tie trustee any reference to tie deed of separation. We must consider tie instruments as they are written.
Further in this connection defendant inquires whether after tie execution and certification of tie deed of separation, a certificate under C. S., 2515, is required for a conveyance from tie wife to tie husband, or to a trustee for his benefit, and refers to C. S., 2529. Tiat statute, if it be conceded tiat it is otherwise applicable to the instant case, provides, inter alia, tiat tie wife, who is living separate from her husband under deed of separation, shall be deemed and held to be a free trader from tie registration of such deed, and may convey her real estate without tie assent of her husband. But in the case at hand tie deed of separation was not filed for registration until 12 August, 1932, many months after tie deed to the trustee was executed and acknowledged. Furthermore, while it is not necessary here to so hold, tie wording of tie statute indicates tiat it affects and is only intended to affect deeds of 'married women to third persons, and not those she has attempted to make to her husband. See Foster v. Williams, supra.
Nor do tie recitals in either tie quitclaim deed executed by Mrs. Hatchell and husband to Sydnor DeButts, Trustee, or in tie deed from DeButts, Trustee, to W. Homer Fisher and wife, change tie statutory requirement, or supply tie deficiency.
Hence, we are of opinion and hold tiat tie court below correctly ruled tiat tie deed from Fisher and wife to tie trustee is void, and conveyed nothing, tiat tie tenancy by tie entirety continued to exist between W. Homer Fisher and his wife, Cleo M. Fisher, and tiat, upon absolute divorce being granted, they became tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest therein in fee simple. McKinnon v. Caulk, 167 N. C., 411, 83 S. E., 559. See, also, Davis v. Bass, supra.
Tie allegations are sufficient to indicate tiat W. Homer Fisher did not thereafter make any conveyance of this one-half undivided interest, tiat when he died intestate he was seized of it, and tiat plaintiffs, being some of his heirs at law, assert title thereto. -Also tie allegation of cloud upon tie title of plaintiffs thereto is sufficient to meet legal requirements. Thus plaintiffs have stated a cause of action. Therefore, it is inopportune to extend tie consideration to other points discussed in briefs filed on this appeal, as to which we express no opinion.
For tie reasons herein stated, tie judgment overruling tie demurrer'is