It is provided by ch. 75, Public Laws 1929, that in any action or proceeding against a nonresident, “growing out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident may be involved by reason of tbe operation by bim, for bim, or under bis control or direction, express or implied, of a motor vehicle on any of tbe public highways of this State,” service may be obtained through tbe Commissioner of Revenue. Compliance with tbe provisions of this statute is conceded in tbe instant case.
Tbe question for decision is whether tbe automobile which struck plaintiff’s intestate was being operated at tbe time “for” tbe corporate defendant, or under its “control or direction, express or implied.” Tbe court found that tbe automobile was so operated at tbe time, and accordingly denied tbe defendant’s motion to vacate tbe service of process and to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Denton v. Vassiliades, 212 N. C., 513, 193 S. E., 737. Tbe ruling is supported by tbe record. Bigham v. Foor, 201 N. C., 14, 158 S. E., 548.
Tbe case of Plott v. Michael, 214 N. C., 665, 200 S. E., 431, cited by appellant, is not in point. It involved an attempted service of process under a different statute, C. S., 1137. See White v. Lumber Co., 199 *349N. C., 410, 154 S. E., 620. Likewise, tbe case of Smith v. Haughton, 206 N. C., 587, 174 S. E., 506, is distinguishable, for in that case there was no evidence that the automobile, there owned by the agent and representative of the corporate defendant, was being operated at the time in the business of the corporate defendant, “for” it, or under its “control or direction, express or implied.” Here, just the reverse appears.
The ruling from which the defendant appeals will be upheld.