This case hinges mainly around the question whether there is any evidence tending to show that MacAllister had authority to make the contract sued upon in behalf of the Hotel Company. We conclude that there is.
The plaintiff had the right to deal with MacAllister according to the apparent scope of his authority. Powell v. Lumber Co., 168 N. C., 632, 485 S. E., 1032; Oliver v. Fidelity Co., 176 N. C., 598, 97 S. E., 490; Daniel v. R. R., 136 N. C., 517, 48 S. E., 816; Stewart v. Realty Co., 159 N. C., 230, 74 S. E., 736. Limitations on authority within that scope unknown to plaintiff would not relieve MacAllister’s principal if *230the agent improvidently exceeds the actual authority. Oliver v. Fidelity Co., supra; Hooper v. Trust Co., 190 N. C., 423, 130 S. E., 49. Even in the case of special or limited agency, as relates to third persons, the agent’s authority is presumed to include all necessary means of effectuating its exercise. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 39 Ga. Appeals, 160, 147 S. E., 126. Apparent authority, in case of special agency, and as it relates to third persons, includes authority to do all those things usual and necessary in accomplishing the main act authorized. McDonald v. Pearre Bros. & Co., 5 Ga. Appeals, 130, 62 S. E., 830.
The course of business dealing between the parties in similar transactions is competent evidence upon the question of agency.
The general manager of the defendant admits that he told MacAllister to “put him on” — this in reference to the employment of the plaintiff— and MacAllister did “put him on” twice, on a temporary basis, and thereafter, as alleged by plaintiff, for a definite period of employment. The question arises as to whether or not the difference between employing temporarily and employing for a definite period, however short, is such a distinction as would necessarily, as a matter of law, take the transaction out of MacAllister’s apparent scope of authority when he had been given the power of employment.
There is vigorous denial on the part of the defense that MacAllister had the right to employ for any definite period. This only bears on MacAllister’s actual authority.
The evidence represented by the plaintiff was sufficient to bar a non-suit and must be considered on its merits.
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the judgment of nonsuit should not have been entered, and it is
Reversed.