Tbe plaintiff N. M. Johnson bas evidenced a chain of paper title from tbe common source sufficient, nothing else appearing, to establish bis right to be declared tbe owner of tbe lands in controversy. So bas tbe defendant. However, although defendant bas a priority in point of time of conveyance, tbe plaintiff’s deeds were recorded first. But for our Registration Act, 0. S., 3309, known as tbe Connor Act by virtue of tbe 1885 Amendment, tbe defendant, having tbe first conveyance, would have tbe superior title. Tbis familiar statute reads in part: “No conveyance of land, or contract to convey, or lease of land for more than three years shall be valid to pass any property, as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration, from tbe donor, bargainor or lessor, but from tbe registration thereof within tbe county where tbe land lies.”
Although there are other features to wbicb we will refer, tbe ease binges upon tbe question whether N. M. Johnson is a purchaser for a valuable consideration within tbe purview of tbis statute. Upon tbe record before us we are compelled to bold that be is not.
Tbe valuable consideration urged by tbe plaintiff as sufficient to give him the status of a purchaser for value within tbe meaning of tbe statute is tbe release of a preexisting debt owing to him by J. T. Warren, from whom be indirectly derived title. While contrary inferences might be drawn from tbe evidence as to tbe actuality of that consideration, which seems to have been contingently postponed, we may pass to phases of tbe controversy more pertinent to tbe decision. Tbe chief difficulty with tbe plaintiff Johnson is bis inability to unscramble tbe transactions by wbicb be sought to acquire title and assemble tbe grantor, tbe valuable consideration, and himself as purchaser, in tbe same conveyance.
In tbis State, under an analogous statute—C. S., 311—(King v. McRackan, 168 N. C., 621, 624, 84 S. E., 1027), a mortgagee who takes a conveyance of lands in- security for a preexisting debt is held to be a *436purchaser for value — Weil v. Herring, 207 N. C., 6, 175 S. E., 836; Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C., 684, 128 S. E., 155; Bank v. Cox, 171 N. C., 76, 87 S. E., 967, 969; Fowle v. McLean, 168 N. C., 537, 84 S. E., 852—and, a fortiori, where the property itself is taken by an absolute conveyance in consideration of the cancellation of such preexisting debt, the grantee in the conveyance might be considered a purchaser for value. Perry & Sons v. Mand, 80 A. L. R., 932; Empire State Trust Co. v. Wm. F. Fisher & Co., 67 N. J. E., 602, 60 Atl., 940, 941; Lee Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gay, 164 Wash., 569, 4 P. (2d), 492, 495. But it does not appear that there is any such consideration to support the deed made by J. T. Warren to Sansom, as Warren owed Sansom nothing; and the same is true with regard to the deed and the transaction between Sansom and N. M. Johnson. It is not contended there was any other consideration of value, and the evidence is conclusive that there was not.
The valuable consideration which would bring the subsequent purchaser within the protection of the statute against a prior purchaser under an unrecorded deed is a consideration moving between the parties to the deed, including as parties the beneficiaries, or cestui que trustent in a deed of trust. He must be “a purchaser for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor, or lessor.” Consideration is an incident confined to the deed which it supports; and in this respect each deed in the series presented to us for inspection must stand on its own bottom.
Plaintiff’s method of acquiring title has been unfortunate. The interposition of a third person as an unlabeled conduit for the title broke the continuity of the transaction between plaintiff and Warren. In order to establish his status as a purchaser for value under the statute by virtue of the suggested consideration, it is necessary for the plaintiff to connect himself with the Warren-Sansom deed as party or as beneficiary in the sense above defined. Mere privity of title is not sufficient. Since this deed is absolute on its face and the plaintiff is an apparent stranger to it, nothing will avail him which does not impress upon the deed the character of a trust. A mere parol explanation that the deed, or the series of transactions in which it is involved, was intended for his benefit is not sufficient while the legal aspect of the conveyance is unchanged, and such evidence offends against the rule excluding parol evidence to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of a written instrument; Kindler v. Trust Co., 204 N. C., 198, 187 S. E., 845; Miller v. Farmers Federation, Inc., 192 N. C., 144, 134 S. E., 407; Wilson v. Sandifer, 76 N. C., 347; especially since the contract is within the statute of frauds; Byrd v. Power Co., 205 N. C., 589, 172 S. E., 183; Walters v. Walters, 172 N. C., 328, 90 S. E., 304; Ward v. Gay, 137 N. C., 397, 49 S. E., 884. Certainly parol evidence would be admissible to establish a parol trust, but if the facts of this case could be consid*437ered as coming within any category leading to such a result, plaintiff has laid no foundation for it in his pleading — has merely made a casual gesture toward it in the evidence. Buchanan v. Harrington, 141 N. C., 39, 53 S. E., 478; Moore v. Moore, 151 N. C., 555, 66 S. E., 598; Fisher v. Owens, 132 N. C., 686, 44 S. E., 369.
We think, however, that under the evidence in this case plaintiff N. M. Johnson was estopped from asserting any such equity if it existed. He deliberately chose to have the title to the property made to a third person, by deed absolute on its face, and inconsistent with any trust relation between himself and Sansom, and without the knowledge of Sansom. This was a deliberate transaction, carried out on the advice of counsel, and was intended to avoid legal complications affecting the title, should it be taken in his own name, and, we may assume, designed to cut off all opposing rights and equities. With an intimate knowledge of any equitable right that he might have asserted, the plaintiff put his legal title on record and brought suit upon it. Besides, the evidence is clear that the instrument was written as intended. He must abide by his choice.
An interesting question is raised as to whether the establishment of a parol trust upon a transaction taking place after the acquisition of the title for a valuable consideration by the defendant would avail the plaintiff anything where he is relying solely upon a priority created by the statute, and the defendant has put his legal title on record before any proceeding was begun in which the trust could be established. The Connor Act — C. S., 3309 — is held not to apply to a parol trust but only to written instruments capable of registration. Spence v. Pottery Co., 185 N. C., 218, 220, 117 S. E., 32; Sills v. Ford, 171 N. C., 733, 88 S. E., 636; Pritchard v. Williams, 175 N. C., 319, 97 S. E., 570; Eaton v. Doub, 190 N. C., 14, 21, 128 S. E., 494; Wood v. Tinsley, 138 N. C., 507, 51 S. E., 59. It is not necessary to decide the matter here, but the opinion of the Court, per Stacy, J., in Spence v. Pottery Co., supra, contains a complete exposition of the law on this subject, and a study of this opinion will obviate a more detailed search of the other authorities cited.
Since this case is decided on defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit, it becomes unnecessary to consider the instructions given to the jury or the issues submitted to them. Defendant’s motion for nonsuit should have been allowed and the final judgment of the court, including the orders therein with respect to defendant’s muniments of title, becomes void and inoperative.
The judgment overruling the nonsuit is
Reversed.