Tbe question involved: Did tbe plaintiff sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in tbe course of tbe employment, as found by tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission and affirmed by tbe court below? We think so.
Tbe defendants in their brief say: “We concede at tbe outset that tbe court will not review tbe evidence, except when it is necessary to determine whether there was any evidence to support a finding of fact. For tbe sake of tbis argument, we admit that tbe findings of fact by tbe Industrial Commission are binding upon both tbe plaintiff and tbe defendants. Tbe question, therefore, arising whether upon tbe facts as found by tbe Commission it may be concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in tbe course of bis employment.”
*30In Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723 (725), is the following: “The Workmen's Compensation Law prescribes conditions under which an employee may receive compensation for personal injury. Section 2 (f) declares that ‘injury and personal injury shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall not include a disease in any form, except when it results naturally and unavoidably from accident.’ The condition antecedent to compensation is the occurrence of an (1) injury by accident (2) arising out of and (3) in the course of the employment. . . . (p. 726). The word ‘accident,’ as used here, has been defined as an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury.”
Honnold on Workmen’s Compensation, Vol. 1, sec. 85, p. 85, et seq., in part, says: “The word ‘accident’ refers to the cause of the injury, and is here used in its ordinary and popular sense as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed by the workman himself, a physiological injury as the result of the work he is engaged in, an unusual effect of a known cause, a casualty. It implies that there was an external act or occurrence which caused the injury or death. It contemplates an event not within one’s foresight and expectation resulting in a mishap causing injury to the employee. Such an occurrence may be due to purely accidental causes, or may be due to oversight and negligence. It may be due to carelessness, not willful, to fatigue, or to miscalculation of the effects of voluntary action.” At p. 281 (note) we find: “It was a personal injury by accident where a dock laborer, who was unloading bran containing grit, got some in his eye, and rubbing it, caused an abrasion, necessitating the removal of the eye. Adams v. Thompson (1912), 5 B. W. C. C., 19, C. A.” The above is a case in all respects similar to the present action.
Workmen’s Compensation Law (Schneider), Vol. 1, 2nd Ed., p. 513, is as follows: “The words ‘undesigned’ or ‘unforeseen’ refer to the result produced, and not to its cause. When a man lifts a heavy weight, he intends to do exactly what he does do; nevertheless, if he strains a muscle, or ruptures a blood vessel, the injury is due to accident.”
Plaintiff Love testified, in part: “I have charge of putting chemicals in the water. On or about the 6th of July, 1937, I had occasion to put chemicals in the water. I put lime in a bucket and then in a hopper; we call it a feeder; which is an automatic feeder. On this night I went and got my lime to put it in and got up on the platform to put it in, went to pour it over, and the lime flew in my face and got in my eyes. I tried to get it out and went to the bowl we had there and washed my face. It gave me awful pain, commenced after that in the night, com-. *31menced paining me, just rubbed it, and fooling witb it all nigbt, trying to get it out. No one else is at work at tbe water plant during tbe nigbt except me. Tbe next morning when Mr. Warwick, tbe superintendent of tbe department, came, be said, ‘What is tbe matter witb your eye?’ I said, ‘I got lime in it.’ He said, ‘Why don’t you go and get somebody to wasb it out, you go to some of these eye doctors and get it washed out, it is a dangerous contraption to get that thing in there like that.’ I went to a doctor.”
Dr. Eussell S. Beam testified, in part: “Plaintiff told me be got lime in bis eye while emptying sack of lime in a hopper and rubbed bis eye witb a handkerchief which bad lime on it. . . . I found nothing on examining bis eye after removal that would indicate that it was not a normal eye prior to bis injury. ... I would have to say that tbe loss of tbe eye was caused by injury. ... I am satisfied in my own mind that in all likelihood this trouble was caused by tbe lime that got in bis eye. I don’t think there is any doubt about that.”
From tbe evidence we think the Full Commission was justified in finding: “Tbe Full Commission affirms tbe findings of fact of tbe bearing Commissioner, and makes tbe additional finding of fact: That tbe plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in tbe course of bis regular employment on or about July 6, 1937, when be got lime in bis right eye, which was tbe proximate cause of an infectious condition developing in tbe right eye necessitating tbe enucleation of same.”
Tbe court below “adopts tbe findings of fact as found by tbe Full Commission, and further finds that tbe injuries sustained by tbe plaintiff, John Love, arose out of and in tbe course of bis employment; that be bad been engaged in said employment for a great many years and bad never sustained any injury in tbe course of such employment before; and that tbe cause of tbe injury was an unusual and unexpected event.”
Tbe court adjudged: “That tbe injuries sustained by tbe said John Love was an accident arising out of and in tbe course of bis employment, causing him to lose bis right eye, and tbe award of tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby in all respects affirmed.” Slade v. Hosiery Mills, 209 N. C., 823, and Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C., 365, are distinguishable from tbe present case.
Plaintiff bad been in tbe employment of tbe town of Lumberton for about twenty-four years, working seven nights a week, and in all that period was only off bis job for less than five days, until tbe injury in question occurred. A faithful servant, injured in tbe performance of duty, such as tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act was passed to protect.
We think tbe evidence plenary to sustain tbe findings of fact and com-pensable under tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Tbe judgment of tbe court below is
Affirmed.