The last payment of compensation under the previous award was made in February, 1936, and the petition for review on *9ground of change in condition was filed 5 January, 1937. This is within the year as contemplated by section 46 of the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act, ch. 120, Public Laws 1929, as amended by ch. 274, Public Laws 1931, which provides that “no such review shall be made after twelve months from the date of the last payment of compensation pursuant to an award under this article.” N. C. Code of 1935 (Michie), 8081 (bbb); Lee v. Rose’s Stores, 205 N. C., 310, 171 S. E., 87.
The finding is that plaintiff has experienced a change in his condition since the last award, growing out of the injury of 3 October, 1934, and that he has been totally disabled since January, 1937. It is a reasonable inference, if not a direct finding of the hearing Commissioner, approved by the Eull Commission, that plaintiff’s total disability occurred 1 January, 1937, as compensation payments were ordered to be resumed as of that date.
There is ample evidence to support the finding of a change in plaintiff’s condition as contemplated by the act. Smith v. Swift & Co., 212 N. C., 608; Butts v. Montague Bros., 208 N. C., 186, 179 S. E., 799. There is also evidence which would have supported a contrary finding. Allen v. Mottley Const. Co., 170 S. E. (Va.), 412. With this conflict, however, we are not concerned. It is fully established by numerous decisions that the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal, and they are not subject to review by the courts. Carlton v. Bernhardt-Seagle Co., 210 N. C., 655, 188 S. E., 77; Swink v. Asbestos Co., ibid., 303, 186 S. E., 258; Bryson v. Lumber Co., 204 N. C., 664, 169 S. E., 276.
It results, therefore, that the judgment must be upheld.