The defendant entered in this Court motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the statute under which defendant was tried fails to set out a criminal offense. S. v. Lumber Co., 109 N. C., 860, 13 S. E., 719; Rule 21.
The material portion of the statute under which the criminal charge against the defendant was laid is as follows: “Sec. 11. Any person, firm or corporation not being duly licensed to engage in tile contracting in this State as provided for in this act, . . . shall be guilty of misdemeanor.”
It is apparent that the acts, the doing of which shall constitute a misdemeanor, are not set out. No criminal offense is stated.
It is contended, however, that in the interpretation of the statute, and the ascertainment of the legislative intent, words should be supplied to define the acts to be prohibited, but the court has no power to determine what acts or omissions, if any, the General Assembly intended to make *575unlawful, in tbe absence of an expression of tbe legislative will in tbe language used. Nor was anything said in S. v. Humphrey, 210 N. C., 406, 186 S. E., 473, wbieb may be beld as authority for tbe interpolation of words to constitute a criminal offense when none is set out in tbe statute. Tbe defendant cannot be beld to answer a criminal charge when no certain act is made unlawful. Tbe motion in arrest of judgment must be allowed.
This disposition of tbe case renders it unnecessary to consider on this record tbe question debated as to tbe constitutionality of tbe act and tbe validity of certain of its provisions. In re Parker, 209 N. C., 693, 184 S. E., 532; S. v. Ellis, 210 N. C., 166, 185 S. E., 663; Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S., 633. S. v. Lueders, ante, 558.
Judgment arrested.