Plaintiff challenges the judgment of Williams, J., on three grounds, neither of which is tenable: (1) That the court erred in permitting the defendant to amend verification. ' It is discretionary with the trial judge to allow, such amendment. Moore v. Moore, 130 N. C., 333, 41 S. E., 943. (2) That the allegations of the cross action do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The allegations are sufficient to bring the cross action within the provision of O. S., 1660. (3) That the findings of fact are insufficient to support an award of alimony and counsel fees. It is sufficient for the court to find that the facts are as alleged in the answer. Hennis v. Hennis, 180 N. C., 606, 105 S. E., 274; Massey v. Massey, 208 N. C., 818, 182 S. E., *38446; Vaughan v. Vaughan, 211 N. C., 354, 190 S. E., 492. The facts alleged comply with, the requirements of C. S., 1666, for alimony pendente lite.
The exception to the decree of Burgwyn, J., is well taken. The case was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court. The court below was then without authority to make the order. Vaughan v. Vaughan, supra.
The judgment of Williams, J., is
Affirmed.
The judgment of Burgwyn, J., is
Reversed.