These four questions are presented on this appeal:
I. Where an employee has been employed for the fifty-two weeks prior to the time of the injury which results in death, at wages the *106weekly average of wkich is definitely ascertainable by dividing the total by fifty-two, does tbe North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act require that method of computing the average weekly wages of such employee to be followed?
2. Or, upon finding that for exceptional reasons that that method would be unfair to employee, may the North Carolina Industrial Commission resort to such other method as would most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury?
3. Is there sufficient competent evidence in the record on this appeal to support the fourth finding of fact as to “exceptional reasons?”
4. If so, as a matter of law, do the facts found constitute such “exceptional reasons” within the meaning of subsection “e” of section 2 of chapter 120, Public Laws 1929; C. S., 8081 (i) (e) ?
We answer the first question in the negative, and the last three in the affirmative.
1-2. It will be noted, by reference to the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, Public Laws 1929, eh. 120, sec. 38; O. S., 8081 (tt), that where death of employee results from injury by accident “the employer shall pay ... to the dependents of the employee ... a weekly payment equal to 60 per centum of his average weekly wages .. . .” In subsection “e” of section 2 of the act, “average weekly wages” is defined and methods of computing same with reference to three given situations, prior to injury, are set forth: (a) Where the employment has been continuous for at least fifty-two weeks; (b) where the employment has extended over a period of less than fifty-two weeks; and (c) where, by reason of a shortness of time during which the employee has been in the employment of his employer, or the casual nature or terms of his employment, it is impracticable to compute the average weekly wages as above defined. The three situations are treated in the ■same paragraph. Then there follows in a new paragraph of the same .section this provision: “But where for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair, either to the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be •earning were it not for the injury.”
The words “the foregoing” clearly refer to the preceding paragraph, which includes the three methods of computation above described. Hence, it is manifest that where exceptional reasons are found which make the computation on the basis of either of “the foregoing” methods unfair to the employee, the Legislature intended that the Industrial Commission might resort to such other method of computing the average weekly wages as would most nearly approximate the amount the injured *107.employee would be earning if be were living. The act is so expressed in clear language wbicb requires no interpretation. If construction were required, tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed so as to effectuate the legislative intent or purpose which is to be ascertained from the wording of the act. Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C., 472, 193 S. E., 826, and cases cited.
3-4. The findings of fact by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, when supported by any competent evidence, are binding on both the Superior and Supreme Courts. Public Laws 1929, ch. 120, sec. 60; C. S., 8081 (ppp); Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C., 38, 153 S. E., 591; Southern v. Cotton Mills Co., 200 N. C., 165, 156 S. E., 861; West v. Fertilizer Co., 201 N. C., 556, 160 S. E., 765; Dependents of Poole v. Sigmon, 202 N. C., 172, 162 S. E., 198; Nissen v. Winston-Salem, 206 N. C., 888, 175 S. E., 310; Saunders v. Allen, 208 N. C., 189, 179 S. E., 754; Hildebrand v. Furniture Co., 212 N. C., 100, 193 S. E., 294; Walker v. Wilkins & Co., 212 N. C., 627, 194 S. E., 89.
There is sufficient competent evidence on this record to support the finding of fact as to “exceptional reasons.” Here the employee, during the long period of employment, had made successive advancements from truck driver to stock clerk to salesman with increased wages from time to time. While he had been in the last position less than three months, the evidence discloses that as salesman he entered a new territory, and, in the language of his superior, “with the business he was getting, he would have had further advances . . .” Thus, it is patent that the wages he was receiving at the time of his death were not temporary and uncertain, and constituted a fair basis upon which to compute the award of benefits.
On this record the facts found are sufficient in law to constitute “exceptional reasons” within the meaning of provision of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, to which hereinabove reference is made.
Affirmed.