Upon tbe facts presented in tbe record on this appeal tbe judgment of nonsuit was properly entered. It is apparent tbat plaintiffs have ratified tbe foreclosure sale.
Where, at a foreclosure sale of land under a mortgage deed by a corporation, mortgagee, an officer of tbe corporation buys tbe property, tbe presumption is tbat be acts for tbe corporation, and tbat it is tbe pur*333chaser. Craft v. Assn., 127 N. C., 163, 37 S. E., 190; Shuford v. Bank, 207 N. C., 428, 177 S. E., 408.
The uniform decisions of this Court hold that: “Where a mortgagee • of land purchases at his own sale, directly or by an agent, though he may convey to the agent and have the agent reeonvey to him, the effect is to vest the legal estate in the mortgagee in the same plight and condition as he held it under the mortgage, subject to the right of the mortgagor to redeem (Averitt v. Elliott, 109 N. C., 560, 138 S. E., 785), unless in some way he releases or loses his equity. . . .” The sale by the mortgagee is not void, but only voidable, and ordinarily can be avoided only by the mortgagor or his heirs and assigns. Smith v. Land Bank, post, 343, and eases cited.
Conceding that at the foreclosure sale in the present case the Land Bank, mortgagee, through its agent, purchased the land, it was open to plaintiffs, mortgagors, (1) “To ratify the sale and accept the proceeds, or settled on that basis”; or (2) to pursue one of two remedies: (a) They “may treat the sale as a nullity and have it set aside,” or (b), acting in repudiation of the sale, they may sue the mortgagee for the wrong done in making such a sale, and hold it liable for the true worth of the property; cases cited in Smith v. Land Bank, post, 343, supra.
Here, however, the plaintiffs, contending that they have not ratified the sale, seek to treat the sale as a nullity and have it set aside, and at the same time to hold the mortgagee liable for the true worth of the property. The question of misjoinder, both of parties and of causes of action, is not presented. The former appeal, 211 N. C., 262, discloses that only the defendants Blount, who claim to be innocent purchasers, demurred, and solely for that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them.
It is apparent, however, from the factual situation here that the plaintiffs, by their conduct, have ratified the foreclosure sale. In Joyner v. Farmer, 78 N. C., 196, the Court said: “The estate of the mortgagee acquired by the sale, being voidable only, may be confirmed by any of the means by which an owner of a right in equity may part with it:
“1. By a release under seal, as to which nothing need be said.
“2. Such conduct'as would make assertion of his right fraudulent against the mortgagee or against third persons, and which would, therefore, operate as an estoppel against its assertion.
“3. Long acquiescence after full knowledge.” Shuford v. Bank, supra.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, J. W. Council was in charge of the farm and impliedly represented and acted for his coplaintiffs in the handling of the transaction with the defendant Land Bank. His testimony and letters clearly indicate that, while at the time of the sale he hoped to raise money from the sale of crops to *334pay on tbe notes and to redeem tbe farm, be failed to realize on tbat hope, and abandoned tbe idea of redeeming it. In bis letters of Y November and Y December, 1931, be gives expression to tbe hopelessness of tbe situation, and recognizes tbe right of tbe Land Bank to sell tbe farm. He then set about to rent, and inability to agree on terms of rental prevented him renting the farm for tbe year 1932 — a recognition of title in tbe Land Bank. Tbe language in tbe letter of 1Y November, 1933, “I am interested in buying farm bach, either me or my sister,” is pertinent.
All this manifests such conduct as now makes fraudulent their assertion of any right to have tbe sale as made declared void and set aside. By such conduct they are estopped to maintain this action. Shuford v. Bank, supra. They must settle on tbe basis of sale made.
"Where in a mortgage deed power of sale is granted, without designating place of sale, the mortgagee is vested with sound discretion to select tbe place of sale so as to conserve and promote tbe interest of all tbe parties. Clark v. Homes, 189 N. C., 703, 128 S. E., 20. Here tbe mortgagee selected tbe courthouse door in tbe county seat of tbe county in which tbe land is situated — tbe usual place for bolding public land sales. In doing so there is no abuse of discretion.
The judgment below is
Affirmed.
Baenhili,, J., took no part in tbe consideration or decision of this case.