At the close of plaintiff’s evidence the defendant in the court below made a motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit, which was refused. This motion was renewed at the close of all the evidence (C. S., 567), and was granted. In this we see no error.
Defendant introduced city ordinances of "Winston-Salem, in regard to skating on the street, being section 126, as follows: “Section 126. — Skat*113 ing or Coasting on Street Forbidden. All persons are hereby forbidden to coast on sledge, coaster express wagon, toy wagon or other similar vehicle or move or skate on any roller skates or other similar device on or along that part of any of the streets of the city that lies between the curbing.”
The plaintiff offered the following testimony in rebuttal: Section 141 of the city ordinances of the city of 'Winston-Salem, and also section 170 of the ordinances, as follows : “Section 141 — Vehicles Shall Stop Within Twelve Inches of Curb. — When it is necessary for a vehicle to be stopped at the curb, it shall be stopped with the right-hand side next to the same and both front and rear wheels on said side shall be not more than twelve inches from the curb.” “Section 170. — Police to Manage Traffic. — The police department shall have full power and authority in relation to the management of traffic, including street cars, and all street cars and other vehicles shall instantly stop when ordered to do so by any policeman.”
We find no sufficient evidence in the record that the above ordinance, section 126, has been repealed by the city of Winston-Salem. We think section 170 has no bearing on the facts in this case. From the view we take of the controversy the exceptions and assignments of error made by plaintiff to the admission and exclusion of evidence are immaterial and cannot he sustained.
In Lee v. R. R., 212 N. C., 340 (341), it is held: “Conceding, but not deciding, that the defendant was negligent in permitting the trees and houses to remain on its right of way and in allowing its flat car to stop across the highway without lights or other signals of its presence, still we think the evidence discloses contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff which bars recovery. It is sufficient to defeat recovery if plaintiff’s negligence is one of the proximate causes of the injury, it need not be the sole proximate cause. Construction Co. v. R. R., 184 N. C., 179; Davis v. Jeffreys, 197 N. C., 712.”
Conceding that defendant was negligent in parking her car, yet we think plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. She was sitting on the sled wth her young daughter in front of her, going down a steep incline very fast, on slick ice. The car of defendant, which was parked on the triangle, could be seen by the plaintiff 50 to 100 feet away. There was a large light over the street — a standard light. Plaintiff testified it was a “big street light.” She said that she had a clear passageway on Carolina Avenue of 20 feet. Plaintiff, going down grade at a rapid speed on slick ice, keeping near the curb on Carolina Avenue, hit the rear end of defendant’s car and was injured. We think the contributory negligence of plaintiff was the proximate cause of her injury.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.