The appeal presents two questions: 1. Was there error in the admission of incompetent testimony, or in other rulings of the court, sufficient to require a new trial?
2. Was there evidence sufficient to be submitted to the jury of the guilt of defendant Chase?
1. The defendants contend that in the cross-examination of two of defendants’ witnesses questions tending to impeach the witnesses were so framed as to discredit and prejudice the defendants in the eyes of the jury. The witness Honeycutt was asked if he and the two defendants were not “caught in a hotel in Asheville with a crooked woman,” *729and the witness Briggs, wbo is a justice of tbe peace, was ■ asked if he lad not turned tie defendants loose every time tley were brouglt before lim on any charge, and if be lad not turned defendant Bay loose on a ■charge of felony when witness knew of his own knowledge he was guilty. To this the last named witness replied that he had not done so.
In each instance the court cautioned the jury that this evidence could be considered only for the purpose of impeaching the witness, if it did do so, and that they should not consider it as evidence against the defendants.
This evidence was competent for the purpose of impeaching the witness, though incompetent to discredit the defendants. In this situation involving contradictory rules, to avoid improper use of the evidence, it las been uniformly held that correction lies in the instructions of the presiding judge, when so requested, in order to prevent misunderstanding by the jury and to remove prejudice against the defendant. Wigmore on Ev., sec. 13, and cases cited; Oooper v. R. R., 163 N. C., 150, 79 S. E., 418. It is a well recognized rule of procedure that when evidence competent for one purpose only and not for another is offered it is incumbent upon the objecting party to request the court to restrict the consideration of the jury to that aspect of the evidence which is competent. Rule 21 of this Court; Lockhart on Ev., sec. 19; Roberson v. Stokes, 181 N. C., 59, 106 S. E., 151.
Whether impressions received by jurors from the words spoken can be effaced by a mental effort, under the direction of the court, may provoke debate in the realm of psychology, but our system for the administration of justice through trial by jury is based upon the assumption that the trial jurors are men of character and of sufficient intelligence to fully understand and comply with the instructions of the court, and are presumed to have done so. Wilson v. Mfg. Co., 120 N. C., 94, 26 S. E., 629.
The evidence that the defendant Bay was arrested for shooting at the deceased on the Saturday preceding the homicide was connected with the criminal offense charged in the bill, and was competent to show the relations between the parties and intent and malice on the part of the defendant. S. v. Miller, 189 N. C., 695, 128 S. E., 1; S. v. Stancill, 178 N. C., 683, 100 S. E., 241; Underhill’s Crim. Ev. (4th Ed.), pp. 1103, 1107.
The defendants also noted exception to a remark of counsel assisting the prosecution, in addressing the jury, that one of the defendants “has the hardest face I ever looked into.” It appears from the record that the court immediately stated in the presence of the jury that the remark of counsel was improper. The defendants, however, contend that the court’s failure to instruct the jury not to consider the remark was prejudicial error (S. v. Murdock, 183 N. C., 779, 111 S. E., 610), but *730we are unable to bold tbat tbe jury was misled or influenced by this improper reference to wbat counsel thought of the physical appearance of one of the defendants who was then in the immediate view and presence of the jury, nor does it appear that the defendants requested the court to caution the jury further. Also, in the argument to the jury by one of counsel for the prosecution, some reference was made to the failure of the defendants to go upon the witness stand, and, upon objection by defendants, the court stated at the time that the remark was improper and in his charge carefully instructed the jury not to consider that fact to the prejudice of the defendants. No further or additional caution or instruction was asked by defendants.
The assignments of error on these grounds cannot be sustained.
We have examined the other exceptions to the rulings of the court and find them without substantial merit.
2. Was the evidence against the defendant Chase of sufficient probative force to warrant its submission to the jury? This defendant in apt time moved for judgment as of nonsuit, and now upon appeal assigns as error the denial of his motion.
All the evidence showed the defendant Ray shot and killed the deceased, and that defendant Chase, though present, did not join in the fatal shooting. The guilt of Chase was predicated upon the view that he was present aiding and abetting Ray, giving him assistance and encouragement, or that the killing was the result of the pursuit of a common design and purpose participated in by both. Is the evidence sufficient to support that view?
Here it appears from the evidence, considered in its most favorable light for the State, as we must do on a motion for nonsuit, that, from the close relationship and association of the two defendants, Chase was fully aware of the attitude of Ray toward the deceased, was present when Ray shot at him the preceding Saturday, heard Ray’s expression of his intent to kill him, knew of his purpose to attack him when opportunity arose, accompanied him on several different occasions during the week when they were apparently looking for deceased, and on the day of the homicide was a/med and accompanied Ray for several hours in apparently following deceased about the streets of the town, and by his presence gave aid and encouragement to Ray’s unlawful purpose.
Just before the shooting began, Chase’s movement in the street affords ground for the permissible inference that he was attempting to take a position to the side or rear of the deceased, which would have enabled him to be of - assistance to Ray if required. Chase’s action evidently led the deceased to so conclude, hence his warning to Chase not to try to get behind him. After the fatal shooting Ray ran one way and Chase drove Ray’s car another, but both ways led to Ray’s home.
*731While tbe defendant’s evidence tended to warrant a more favorable aspect of Chase’s conduct, tbe circumstances disclosed by tbe State’s evidence consisted of more than a mere conjecture or suspicion of guilt (S. v. Prince, 182 N. C., 788, 108 S. E., 330), and constituted evidence of sufficiently definite probative value to justify its submission to tbe jury under appropriate instructions from tbe court. S. v. McLeod, 198 N. C., 649, 152 S. E., 895.
Tbe principle is well established that one who, being present, gives aid and comfort, counsel or encouragement to another, in tbe commission of a crime, is guilty as a principal. S. v. Cloninger, 149 N. C., 567, 63 S. E., 154; S. v. Hart, 186 N. C., 582, 120 S. E., 345; S. v. Dail, 191 N. C., 234, 131 S. E., 574; S. v. Gosnell, 208 N. C., 401, 181 S. E., 323.
From a consideration of the entire record, including tbe full and .accurate charge of tbe court, we conclude that in tbe trial there was