While the complaint does not allege two causes of action, each separate and apart from the other, as required by the Rules of Practice (200 N. C., 826, Rule 20, subsection 2), but alleges all of the facts as if they constituted one cause of action, it in fact states two separate and distinct causes.
1. It alleges that L. D. Todd, administrator of the estate of E. A. Todd, has filed a false final account, has deducted commissions to which he is not entitled, has failed to make a fair and equal distribution of assets of the estate according to the priorities provided by statute, but that on the other hand he has made payments to unsecured creditors without making a ratable payment upon the claim of the plaintiff; and that the said administrator has disposed of the property of the estate to relatives at a grossly inadequate price, and that he has otherwise failed to properly discharge his duties as administrator.
*6792. Tbe complaint likewise alleges tbat E. A. Todd (wbo died in 1930), on 1 December, 1928, executed and delivered a deed to bis real estate to bis son, Albert E. Todd, and wife, Atbalia (Atbelye) Todd, and tbat tbis conveyance was made without consideration witb intent to binder and delay tbis plaintiff and bis other creditors, and without reserving sufficient property to pay bis then existing debts. It then proceeds to allege tbat thereafter Albert F. Todd and wife conveyed said lands to R. M. Kermon and wife, Annie M. Kermon, trustees; tbat R. M. Ker-mon and wife, trustees, leased a portion of said property to tbe Texas Company; tbat R. M. Kermon and wife, trustees, and A. F. Todd and wife, and L. D. Todd executed a trust deed to C. D. Hogue, trustee for tbe Cooperative Building & Loan Association, and tbat thereafter R. M. Kermon and wife, trustees, conveyed said property to L. D. Todd and A. F. Todd and wife; tbat later A. F. Todd and wife and L. D. Todd executed a mortgage upon said property to Mary Alma Kermon.
Tbe complaint then further alleges tbat all of tbe foregoing conveyances were made witb full knowledge tbat tbe original conveyance from E. A. Todd was made and executed witb tbe fraudulent intent to binder and delay bis creditors, of whom the-plaintiff was then one.
In tbe first cause of action L. D. Todd, administrator, and A. F. Todd and Atbalia (Atbelye) Todd, as sureties upon tbe administrator’s bond, are tbe only necessary and proper parties. Tbe other defendants herein have no interest in said controversy and are improper parties as to said cause of action. As to tbe 'second cause of action, all of tbe defendants except tbe sureties upon tbe administrator’s bond are, perhaps, necessary and proper parties.
Tbe two causes of action are unrelated and tbe facts alleged do not state one cause of action arising out of one and tbe same transaction, or a series of transactions forming oné course of dealing and all ténding to one end. Tbe allegations do not constitute one connected story, which can be told as a whole. Tbe deed of E. A. Todd dated in 1928 was executed approximately two years prior to bis death. Tbat and succeeding transactions in respect to said land alleged in tbe complaint are entirely distinct and wholly unconnected witb any acts of maladministration or devastavit on tbe part of tbe administrator of tbe estate of E. A. Todd. Leach v. Page, 211 N. C., 622; Bank v. Jones, 211 N. C., 317; Barkley v. Realty Co., 211 N. C., 540; and Daniels v. Duck Island, ante, 90, and cases cited, are not in point. Tbis ease falls within tbe line of decisions represented by Pearson v. Westbrook, 206 N. C., 910, and cases there cited.
There is a misjoinder of parties and causes of action, and tbe demurrers interposed by tbe several defendants were properly sustained. Tbe judgment below is
Affirmed.