Under tbe Emergency Revenue Act of 1937, Article Y, section E, of chapter 127, Public Laws 1937, “wholesale” and “retail” merchants are required to pay a sales tax, as a license or privilege tax, upon tbe sale within this State of tangible personal property, tbe rate upon sales at wholesale being 1/20 of 1 per cent and tbe rate upon sales at retail being 3 per cent of tbe value of tbe merchandise sold.
It is further provided in tbe act that “tbe sale of any article of merchandise by a ‘wholesale merchant’ to any one other than a merchant for resale” shall be taxable at tbe retail rate, and tbe Commissioner of Revenue is authorized to promulgate appropriate regulations defining transactions carrying tbe different rates. Sec. 405.
Pursuant to this statutory authority, tbe Commissioner of Revenue has issued regulation No. 85, classifying tbe transactions here in question *626as subject to tbe retail rate. Tbe correctness of tbis regulation is challenged by tbe plaintiffs. They contend that tbe transactions should be denominated sales at wholesale, and, therefore, entitled to tbe lesser rate.
Tbe. act contains its own glossary or definition of terms. Sec. 404. Tbe pertinent ones follow:
1. Tbe words “wholesale merchant” shall mean every person who engages in tbe business of buying any articles of commerce and selling same to merchants for resale.
2. Tbe words “retail merchant” shall mean every person who engages in tbe business of buying or acquiring, by consignment or otherwise, any article of commerce and selling same at retail.
3. Tbe word “merchant” shall include any individual, firm, or corporation, domestic or foreign, estate or trust, subject to tbe tax herein imposed.
4. Tbe word “retail” shall mean the sale of any article of commerce in any quantity or quantities for any use or purpose on the part of the purchaser other than for resale.
5. The word “sale” shall mean any transfer of the ownership or title of tangible personal property for any kind of .consideration, regardless of the name that may be given to such transaction.
It may be conceded that plaintiffs are “wholesale merchants” within the meaning of the act in question, and that sales made by them to merchants for resale are properly taxable at the wholesale rate. And there is no denial that ordinarily heating and plumbing contractors are not regarded as merchants. It is the contention of the plaintiffs, however, that under the definition of the word “sale” as “any transfer of the ownership or title of tangible personal property,” such contractors engaged in fulfilling lump-sum contracts are properly denominated merchants within the meaning of the act, for they buy heating and plumbing materials, incorporate them in heating and plumbing systems, and transfer title thereto to the owners of the buildings. The argument is ingenious, and finds support among the authorities. Blome Co. v. Ames, 365 Ill., 456, 6 N. E. (2d), 841; Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill., 162, 194 N. E., 272; Mason Lbr. Co. v. Lee, 126 Fla., 371, 171 So., 332.
We are unable to accept plaintiffs’ view as the proper interpretation of the statute. “Some play must be allowed for the joints of the machine” — Mr. Justice Holmes in M. T. & K. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S., 267. A manufacturer buys raw materials, uses them in producing the finished product which he sells, but it would hardly be contended that he buys the raw materials for resale. Certainly not in the ordinary acceptation of the term. They are to be used for manufacturing purposes. Boyer-Campbell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich., 282, 260 N. W., 165. So it is with heating and plumbing contractors who buy materials and supplies *627for use in fulfilling lump-sum contracts. They purchase the materials and supplies, not for resale as tangible personal property, but for use in producing the turn-key job. There is no resale of the materials and supplies, as such, either actual or intended, within the meaning of the act. 23 E. 0. L., 1233.
Speaking to a similar contention made under the Maryland statute in the case of S. v. Christhilf, 170 Md., 586, 185 Atl., 456, Sloan, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “. . . we cannot agree with the view that there is a transfer of title to so many feet of lumber, kegs of nails, thousands of brick, perches of stone, cubic yards of concrete, or other items of materials entering into a lump-sum contract, for a complete job or structure, which, when erected on the customer’s land, is as much real property as the land itself and is by no sort of definition or reasoning Tangible personal property.’ State v. J. Watts Kearny & Sons, 181 La., 554, 160 So., 77.”
Other arguments, more or less plausible, were advanced by the plaintiffs on the hearing and in brief, but it is concluded the sum of the matter should be an affirmance of the judgment below. That a contrary holding would yield the State two taxes instead of one, and hence more revenue, cannot avail as a criterion of construction. Nor is it fatal to the challenged regulation that it differs from a previous one issued under prior statutes, or that it may even represent a volte face in the matter. The authorization to issue the regulation was “to prevent abuse with respect to existing regulations.” Sec. 405. This reveals the legislative intent. The heart of a statute is the intention of the law-making body. Trust Co. v. Hood, Comr., 206 N. C., 268, 173 S. E., 601.
The judgment appears to be correct.
Affirmed.