It is the position of the defendant that the presumptions arising from an intentional killing with a deadly weapon, to wit, the unlawfulness of the killing and malice (S. v. Keaton, 206 N. C., 682, 175 S. E., 296), are rebutted by the State’s own evidence, and that upon the whole case he is entitled to an acquittal. S. v. Gregory, 203 N. C., 528, 166 S. E., 387; S. v. Carter, 204 N. C., 304, 168 S. E., 204. We agree with the trial court that the evidence is such as to require its submission to the jury. While one is permitted to kill in defense of himself, his family or habitation, under certain conditions, S. v. Marshall, 208 N. C., 127, 179 S. E., 427; S. v. Glenn, 198 N. C., 79, 150 S. E., 663, nevertheless it is a permissible inference from the record that the deceased, unarmed and apparently without immediate threat of violence, was standing at a distance of about fifteen feet from the defendant’s porch when the fatal shot was fired. This precludes a disturbance of the ruling on the demurrer to the evidence or the motion to nonsuit. S. v. Cagle, 209 N. C., 114, 182 S. E., 697; S. v. Johnson, 184 N. C., 637, 113 S. E., 617; S. v. Cox, 153 N. C., 638, 69 S. E., 419.
The right to kill in self-defense rests upon necessity, real or apparent, and ordinarily it is for the jury to determine, from the evidence, the existence or absence of such necessity. S. v. Bland, 97 N. C., 438, 2 S. E., 460; S. v. Robinson, 188 N. C., 784, 125 S. E., 617; S. v. Bryson, 200 N. C., 50, 156 S. E., 143; S. v. Eubanks, 209 N. C., 758, 184 S. E., 839; S. v. Koutro, 210 N. C., 144, 185 S. E., 682.
In the indictment, the defendant is charged with the murder of one “Oakes Clement.” It is conceded that the proper spelling of his name is “Okes Clement.” The variance is not material, as it is a plain case of idem sonans. S. v. Donnell, 202 N. C., 782, 164 S. E., 352; S. v. Dingle, 209 N. C., 293, 183 S. E., 376.
The verdict and judgment will be upheld.
No error.