Tbe sole question on this appeal is: Did tbe death of William Lloyd Neely result from “injury by accident” within tbe meaning of tbe North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act? We think not.
There is no controversy as to tbe fact that tbe death arose out of and in tbe course of tbe employment. Hence, inquiry is as to what is such “injury by accident.” C. S., 8081 (i, subsec. f). Tbe meaning of that term is clearly and fully discussed and treated by Stacy, C. J., in tbe case of Slade v. Hosiery Mills, 209 N. C., 823, 184 S. E., 844. Tbe fact situation of that case is on almost “all-fours” witb tbe instant case. Tbe decision there controls here.
Tbe work in which tbe deceased was engaged was tbe usual work incident to bis employment. Tbe surrounding conditions might be expected at a fire. Tbe falling in of tbe roof is a natural result of fire burning there. Heat and smoke are expected. Physical exertion is required in handling tbe bose and fire-fighting equipment. Tbe firemen, of neces*367sity, act hurriedly. We find no evidence of an accident. “There must be an accident followed by an injury by such accident which results in harm to the employee before it is compensable under our statute.” Slade v. Hosiery Mills, supra.
Judgment below is
Affirmed.