In this case it is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendants are liable to him for the damages which be has sustained by reason of the injuries which be suffered, as alleged in the complaint, on the principle on which the attractive nuisance doctrine is founded. See Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Company v. Stone, 17 Wall., 657, 21 L. Ed., 745. This doctrine has been repudiated by the courts of many of the states, but has been recognized by this Court as sound in principle and humane in policy. Thus, in Briscoe v. Lighting & Power Co., 148 N. C., 396, 62 S. E., 600, it is said:
“It must be conceded that the liability for injuries to children sustained by reason of dangerous conditions on one’s premises is recognized and enforced in cases in which no such liability accrues to adults. This we think sound in principle and humane in policy. We have no disposition to deny it or to place unreasonable restrictions upon it. We think that the law is sustained upon the theory that the infant who enters upon premises, having no legal right to do so, either by permission, invitation, or license, or relation to the premises or its owner, is as essentially a trespasser as an adult; but, if to gratify a childish curiosity, or in obedience to a childish propensity excited by the character of the structure or other conditions, be goes thereon, and is injured by the failure of the *100owner to properly guard or cover the dangerous conditions which he has created, he is liable for such injuries, provided the facts are such as to impose the duty of anticipation or prevision; that is, whether, under all of the circumstances, he should have contemplated that children would be attracted or allured to go upon his premises and sustain injury.”
In the instant case, no facts are alleged in the complaint upon which it can be held that any duty was imposed by the law upon the defendants, or either of them, to foresee that a child who had gone upon the premises of the defendants to play with other children would climb up the inside wall of the house and then crawl out on the ceiling under the roof. Conceding that the defendants knew that the ceiling was rotten and defective, it does not follow that defendants owed to the plaintiff the duty to foresee that he would crawl between the ceiling and the roof of the house, and to guard against the danger which the plaintiff would thereby incur.
The “attractive nuisance doctrine” cannot be extended to apply to the facts alleged in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer in this case, and thereby impose liability upon the defendants for injuries which they could not have foreseen would be suffered by the plaintiff.
The demurrer should have been sustained. The order overruling the demurrer is
Reversed.