We are of opinion that on the verdict at the trial of this action, the defendant is entitled to have the sum paid by him to the plaintiff as the consideration for her deed to him, to wit, $25.00, applied as a credit on the amount found by the jury as the rental value of the land described in the complaint for the years during which the defendant was in possession of said land, to wit: 1935 and 1936.
When a court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, cancels a contract or deed, it should seek to place the parties in statu quo, as nearly as this can be done, for while one party to the contract or deed may have been wronged by the other, the court does not undertake by its judgment to punish the wrongdoer. The wrong is ordinarily adequately avenged when the status quo is restored. This principle is recognized by Walker, J., in Hodges v. Wilson, 165 N. C., 323, 81 S. E., 340. It is applicable in the instant case.
There is no error in the judgment denying the defendant credit for the amount expended by him in making permanent improvements on the *467land while he was in possession under a deed from the plaintiff which he had procured from the plaintiff by undue influence, when he knew that she was without sufficient mental capacity to execute a deed. The instant case is distinguishable from Hinton v. West, 210 N. C., 712, 188 S. E., 410.
The judgment as modified in accordance with this opinion is affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.