With the finding that the Iron Eireman in question was not covered by the deed of trust and the further concession that it never became a fixture, or a part of the realty, Springs v. Refining Co., 205 N. C., 444, 171 S. E., 635, it follows that the tenant’s right to remove the same can only be denied, if at all, on the principle of estoppel, Bank v. Winder, 198 N. C., 18, 150 S. E., 489, which is here negatived by the finding that “no officer or agent of the Bon Marche, Inc., ever at any time made any representation regarding the ownership of said Iron Fireman, or discussed the same in any way with the plaintiff or any officer or agent'of the plaintiff.”
It is true that where one stands by and without protest suffers his property to be sold to an innocent purchaser, it is but meet that thereafter he should be estopped from denying the title acquired at said sale. McNeely v. Walters, ante, 112; Sugg v. Credit Corp., 196 N. C., 97, 144 S. E., 554; Trust Co. v. Wyatt, 191 N. C., 133, 131 S. E., 311; Upton v. Ferebee, 178 N. C., 194, 100 S. E., 310; LeRoy v. Steamboat Co., 165 N. C., 109, 80 S. E., 984; Holmes v. Crowell, 73 N. C., 613; Armfield v. Moore, 44 N. C., 158. “What I knowingly induce my neighbor to regard as true is the truth as between us, if he has been misled to his injury by my asseveration or conduct” — Walker, J., in Boddie v. *274 Bond, 154 N. C., 359, 70 S. E., 824. In tbe 'instant case, however, there is no contention that the Iron Fireman was covered by the deed of trust, or that it was offered for sale by the commissioner. Only the property “belonging to said mortgagors” was sold under the foreclosure. Hence, the doctrine of estoppel would seem to be inapplicable.
The case of Bank v. Planting and Refining Co., 107 La., 650, quite similar in many respects to the one at bar, is distinguishable by reason of the fact that there “the opponent stood by and without protest suffered these movables to be thus sold.”
On the record, the judgment of the Superior Court appears to be correct.
Affirmed.