The demurrer to the jurisdiction is interposed upon the ground that the proper remedy for “contesting the validity of an election” is a proceeding by information in the nature of a quo warranto, brought by the Attorney-General of the State, C. S., 870, or by a private relator with leave of the Attorney-General, O. S., 871. Cooper v. Crisco, *719201 N. C., 739, 161 S. E., 310. In support of tbis position, the defendants rely chiefly upon the decisions in Saunders v. Gatling, 81 N. C., 298, and Britt v. Bd. Canvassers, 172 N. C., 797, 90 S. E., 1005. The authorities cited are inapposite. The present action is not to try title to office, but to contest the validity of a special school tax election. Forester v. N. Wilkesboro, 206 N. C., 347, 174 S. E., 112; Murphy v. Greensboro, 190 N. C., 268, 129 S. E., 614. The form of the action, or the appropriateness of the proceeding, is sanctioned by a long line of decisions, of which the following may be cited as illustrative: Hill v. Skinner, 169 N. C., 405, 86 S. E., 351; Clark v. Statesville, 139 N. C., 490, 52 S. E., 52; Jones v. Comrs., 107 N. C., 248, 12 S. E., 69; Rigsbee v. Durham, 99 N. C., 341, 6 S. E., 64; Rigsbee v. Durham, 98 N. C., 81, 3 S. E., 749; McDowell v. Const. Co., 96 N. C., 514, 2 S. E., 351; Smith v. Wilmington, 98 N. C., 343, 4 S. E., 489; Wood v. Oxford, 97 N. C., 227, 2 S. E., 653; Smallwood v. New Bern, 90 N. C., 36; Perry v. Whitaker, 71 N. C., 475. “Where a taxpayer shows prima facie that an illegal tax is about to be levied by the county authorities, . . . courts of equity will restrain such abuse of power at his instance” — Avery, J., in Vaughn v. Comrs., 118 N. C., 636, 24 S. E., 425.
Title to office is- properly triable by information in the nature of quo warranto, because the prerogatives of sovereignty are at stake, Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S., 449, but not so in an action to test the validity of a tax sought to be levied, even with popular approval. Eaton v. Graded School, 184 N. C., 471, 114 S. E., 689; Proctor v. Comrs., 182 N. C., 56, 108 S. E., 360; Woodall v. Highway Com., 176 N. C., 377, 97 S. E., 226.
Unless otherwise provided by statute, injunction at the instance of a taxpayer is regarded as an appropriate remedy to resist the levy of an invalid assessment, McDowell v. Const. Co., supra, or to restrain the collection of an illegal tax. Reynolds v. Asheville, 199 N. C., 212, 154 S. E., 85. The position finds support, not only in the decisions, but also in the statutes on the subject. C. S., 858; C. S., 7979; Ragan v. Doughton, 192 N. C., 500, 135 S. E., 328; R. R. v. Comrs., 188 N. C., 265, 124 S. E., 560; Sherrod v. Dawson, 154 N. C., 525, 70 S. E., 739; Lbr. Co. v. Smith, 146 N. C., 199, 59 S. E., 653.
It follows, therefore, that the demurrer was properly overruled on the first and second grounds.
The third ground of the demurrer is, that allegations made only “on information and belief” are bad as against a demurrer. In support of this position, the defendants cite, among others, the decisions in So. Ry. Co. v. Rollins, 45 Ga. App., 270, 164 S. E., 216, and Moore v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App., 508, 173 S. E., 481.
Without pausing to debate the sufficiency of the allegations made on information and belief, and to distinguish or point out the inapposite*720ness of the authorities cited, it is enough to say that the allegations of paragraph seventeen of the complaint are good as against a demurrer. Calahan v. Roberts, 208 N. C., 768, 182 S. E., 657; Linker v. Linker, 167 N. C., 651, 83 S. E., 736. In this view of the matter, the third ground of the demurrer becomes academic.
The demurrer admits facts well pleaded. Bank v. Gahagan, ante, 464; Sutton v. Ins. Co., 209 N. C., 826, 184 S. E., 821; Oliver v. Hood, Comr., ibid, 291, 183 S. E., 657; Distributing Corp. v. Maxwell, ibid., 47, 182 S. E., 724; Phifer v. Berry, 202 N. C., 388, 163 S. E., 119. It was properly overruled on all three grounds.
Affirmed.