Is plaintiffs’ claim one of preference or one of commonalty? This is the only question. The amount is agreed upon, and all other matters were reserved for future determination.
It is not perceived upon what theory the ease can be distinguished in principle from a general deposit by any other legally self-depositing fiduciary, e.g., fiscal or financial agent (Trust Co. v. Hood, Comr., 206 N. C., 268, 173 S. E., 601; Underwood v. Hood, Comr., 205 N. C., 399, 171 S. E., 364), executor (In re Garner Banking and Trust Co., 204 N. C., 791, 168 S. E., 813), guardian (In re Home Savings Bank, 204 N. C., 454, 168 S. E., 688; Bank v. Corp. Com., 201 N. C., 381, 160 S. E., 360; Hicks v. Corp. Com., 201 N. C., 819, 161 S. E., 545; Roebuck v. Surety Co., 200 N. C., 196, 156 S. E., 531), trustee (Parker v. Hood, Comr., 209 N. C., 494), “Mortgage Pool Account” made up of sums due guardians, executors, administrators, and other fiduciaries (Cocke v. Hood, Comr., 207 N. C., 14, 175 S. E., 841). Especially is this so when, as here, the cestui agrees that the cash deposits in the hands of the custodian shall be “treated like other savings deposits,” retains control over the disposition of the funds, and receives interest thereon.
Under the foregoing authorities, the trial court was justified in holding plaintiffs’ claim properly provable as one of commonalty, and not one of j)reference.
The cases of Andrews v. Hood, Comr., 207 N. C., 499, 177 S. E., 636; Zachery v. Hood, Comr., 205 N. C., 194, 170 S. E., 641; Cocke v. Hood, Comr., 205 N. C., 832, 170 S. E., 637; Lauerhass v. Hood, Comr., 205 N. C., 190, 170 S. E., 655; Flack v. Hood, Comr., 204 N. C., 337, 168 *69S. E., 520, cited and relied upon by plaintiffs, are distinguishable by reason of different fact situations.
The judgment is supported by the decisions first above cited.
Affirmed.
Devin, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.