(1) As to the first three issues, we see no error. On 14 January, 1935, the plaintiff purchased from the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, the land in controversy, paying for same $1,500, in cash, including taxes. There was nothing on the records in the office of the register of deeds in Duplin County, N. C., where the land was situated, *606showing that either of the defendants, J. H. Eehder or J. H. 'Wallace, had any interest in the land in controversy.
In Bender v. Tel. Co., 201 N. C., 356, quoting from Bank v. Smith, 186 N. C., at p. 641, citing numerous authorities, is the following: “Where the registration of an instrument is required, no notice to purchaser, however full and formal, will supply the place of registration.” C. S., 3308, 3309.
(2) There is neither allegation nor sufficient proof that tends, in any way, to connect the defendant The Federal Land Bank of Columbia with the controversies involved in this action.
In the record is the following: “This cause coming on to be heard before his Honor, Henry A. Grady, judge presiding, and being heard upon motion of D. L. Carlton, attorney for the defendant The Federal Land Bank of Columbia, for judgment that this action be dismissed as to said defendant The Federal Land Bank of Columbia. It is ordered, therefore, that The Federal Land Bank of Columbia be and it is hereby dismissed as a party defendant to this action, and that the said defendant recover its costs incurred in this action, to be taxed by the clerk.” There is no exception and assignment of error in the record to this judgment.
(3) The contest narrows itself down to a controversy between the defendants J. H. Eehder and J. H. Wallace. The defendant J. H. Wallace is uneducated, practically illiterate, and can read and write but little, and is able to do but little more than write his own name.
The defendant Wallace offered in evidence, unobjected to, the following exhibits: “Exhibit A: 'This is to certify that I will buy the 26-acre farm, formerly the Nelson Young farm at Eose Hill, for the sum of $2,000, and agree to pay $100.00 by Nov. 1, 1933, and $100.00 by June 1, and $150.00 by Nov. 1, 1934, and the balance per year same as in 1934, until the full amount is paid. I also agree to pay six per cent per annum on balance each year. If I fail to make these payments same is null and void. J. H. Wallace.’ This is the paper Mr. Eehder prepared and handed to me. I saw him write it and he handed it to me: Exhibit B: 'This is to certify that I will buy the 26-acre farm, formerly the Nelson Young farm at Eose Hill, for the sum of $2,000, and agree to pay $100.00 by Nov. 1, 1933, and $100.00 by June 1, 1934, and $150.00 by Nov. 1, 1934, and the balance per year $250.00, same as in 1934, until full amount is paid. I do agree to pay 6% per annum on balance each year. J. H. Eehder.’ ”
In the fourth issue, unobjected to, these memoranda were dated 30 September, 1933. The defendant Wallace was let into the possession of the land in the early part of 1933. The memoranda were in the fall, 30 September, 1933. The jury found that Wallace paid Eehder on the purchase price of the land $278.29, and the improvements put there by *607Wallace amounted to $200.00, making a total of $478.29. The deed to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia to plaintiff was made on 14 January, 1935. Rehder’s contract with Wallace called for $100.00 1 November, 1933; $100.00 1 June, 1934; $150.00 1 November, 1934. A totál of $350.00 and interest.
In The record is: "Exhibit L: Card addressed to J. H. Wallace: ‘Wilmington, N. O., Oct. 12-33. Replying to your letter, the farm is my property. Please let me bear from you with payment. Best wishes, (signed) J. H. Rebder.’ ”
Wallace testified: “He (Rebder) said be owned The land, that it was bis land.” On The entire record there is no evidence that Rebder ever bad title to this land that be agreed to sell to this illiterate man for $2,000, and which was later sold to plaintiff for $1,500. Now Rebder claims that Wallace cannot recover for The amount paid on The land, $278.29, and improvements, $200.00, for in The contract is The following: “If I fail to make these payments same is null and void.”
In Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C., 96 (100), we find: “If The plaintiff’s intestate entered upon The defendant’s land under a parol contract and placed valuable and permanent improvements thereon, and The defendant, after such improvements were made, repudiates The contract and refuses to convey, The plaintiff has an equitable cause of action. . . : (citing authorities). The Court says in many of these cases -that it would be against equity and good conscience to allow The bargainor to repudiate bis contract, and thereby to reap The benefit of The bargainee’s money and labor. . . . (p. 102-3). It seems to be settled by this Court that it may be done; and The cases cited show that where a party is induced to go upon land and put valuable improvements thereon, by The owner thereof, upon a parol promise to convey The same to The party putting The improvements on The land, and The owner afterwards refuses to convey, it is held by this Court to be a fraud upon The party so induced, and The Court will compel him to pay for such improvements.”
In Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N. C., 25 (26), citing many authorities, it is written: “It is well settled that The owner of land who has entered into a contract of this character cannot repudiate The contract and retain The benefits which be has received under it, whether in The form of money paid upon The purchase price or of The enhanced value of The land by reason of improvements.” Carter v. Carter, 182 N. C., 186; Perry v. Norton, 182 N. C., 585; Eaton v. Doub, 190 N. C., 14 (22-23).
The present case is in many respects similar to Insurance Co. v. Cordon, 208 N. C., 723, where it was held that delivery of a contract to convey land is essential to constitute it a valid and enforcible agreement. In that case Jones v. Sandlin, 160 N. C., 150 (154), is cited, where it is said: “The general rule is that if one is induced to improve land under *608a promise to convey the same to him, which promise is void or voidable, and after the improvements are made he refuses to convey, the party thus disappointed shall have the benefit of the improvements to the extent that they increased the value of the land,” citing authorities.
Rehder made a contract with Wallace that he could not perform. As he did not own the land the contract was impossible of performance. Wallace did not know this; in fact, Rehder wrote him “October 12, 1933 —the farm is my property,” and also told him that he owned the land. He induced Wallace to pay, as found by the jury, $278.29 on the land and make improvements in the sum of $200.00, on a contract which he could not perform. It is well settled in law and equity that a party injured can recover where a contract is brought about either by sup-pressio veri or concealment of the truth or suggesiio falsi. Isler v. Brown, 196 N. C., 685 (686). Now Rehder contends that Wallace having failed to make the payments, the contract to convey was “null and void.” Wallace is evicted under an unquestioned title. Suppose Wallace had complied with the contract as contended for by Rehder, he could convey him no title, as he had none. In law, equity, and good conscience, Rehder should pay the amount paid to him by Wallace on the land — $278.29, and improvements, $200.00; total, $478.29, less the rental value of the land for 1933 and 1934 — $150.00. The jury has found that the fair rental value of the land for the years 1933 and 1934 was $150.00. This should be deducted from the $478.29 and judgment rendered for Wallace for $328.29. On all the evidence in the record, the answer to the fifth issue should have been “Yes,” and the court below should have so instructed the jury.
Under the contract in controversy, Wallace was to pay 6% interest. In the contract it is stated further that if he failed to make these payments “same is null and void.” Both in law and equity forfeitures and penalties have always been abhorred and are usually looked upon as oppressive and evidencing fraud and bad faith. In 8 R. C. L., part sec. 117, page 568, speaking to the subject, it is said: “It is impossible to lay down any abstract rule as to what may or may not be extravagant or unconscionable to insist upon, for each case must in great measure depend on its own particular facts and circumstances. Generally speaking, in determining the reasonableness of the amount, the court will take into consideration the relation of the parties, their situation, the absence or presence of fraud or oppression, and the purpose the agreement seeks to subserve.”
For the reasons given, the judgment is modified and affirmed in accordance with this opinion.
Modified and affirmed.