After a careful investigation of the controversy, we think there was error in the opinion of the court below that Katina Russos was not entitled to a homestead exemption in the lots in controversy.
The plaintiff had a duly docketed judgment, on 18 June, 1934, for $736.96, and interest, against the defendants Grus Russos and wife, Katina Russos, in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court for Wake County, North Carolina, and at the time Katina Russos was the owner of two lots of land in said county.
N. C. Code, 1935 (Michie), sec. 614, in part, says that such judgment “is a lien on the real property in the county where the same is docketed of every person against whom any such judgment is rendered, and which he has at the time of the docketing thereof in the county in which such real property is situated, or which he acquired at any time thereafter, for ten years from the date of the rendition of the judgment.”
Constitution of North Carolina, Art. X, sec. 2, is as follows: “Every homestead, and the dwellings and buildings used therewith, not exceeding ill value one thousand dollars, to be selected by the owner thereof, or in lieu thereof, at the option of the owner, any lot in a city, town, or village with the dwelling and buildings used thereon, owned and occupied by any resident of this State, and not exceeding the value of one thousand dollars, shall be exempt from sale under execution or other final process obtained on any debt. But no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes or for payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of said premises.”
On 30 October, 1934, Katina Russos and her husband conveyed, in accordance with the Constitution, the lots in controversy to one Christine Roukis, and by so doing Katina Russos parted with her homestead rights and the judgment creditor could have sold the lots if done before the property was reconveyed to Katina Russos.
N. C. Code, 1935 (Michie), sec. 729, is as follows: “The allotted homestead is exempt from levy so long as owned and occupied by the homesteader or by anyone for him, but when conveyed by him in the mode authorized by the Constitution, Art. X, sec. 8, the exemption ceases as to liens attaching prior to the conveyance. The homesteader who has conveyed his allotted homestead may have another allotted, and as often as is necessary. This section shall not have any retroactive effect.” This section seems to deal with “allotted homesteads.” See *125 Sash Co. v. Parker, 153 N. C., 130. In Cheek v. Walden, 195 N. C., 752 (758), it is said: “Upon conveyance by tbe homesteader tbe exemption ceases.” Duplin County v. Harrell, 195 N. C., 445.
If nothing else appeared in tbe record, tbe plaintiff’s contention would be correct, and it could sell tbe land in controversy on which it bad a lien — for defendants Katina Russos and ber husband bad conveyed her land and parted with her right to a homestead exemption.
The execution on plaintiff’s judgment was issued on 19 August, 1935, and in the hands of the sheriff. The record discloses that the lots, on 20 August, 1935, were reconveyed to Katina Russos, she then being a citizen and resident of Wake County, North Carolina. We think she was entitled to her homestead exemption in said lots. Katina Russos did not reside upon said lots and there were no buildings on said lots. They were the only real estate she owned. From a liberal construction of the Constitution, we think she was entitled to the homestead exemption in same. The plaintiff in its brief nowhere controverts this aspect, its contention was that she had conveyed same.
In Murchison v. Plyler, 87 N. C., 79 (81), Ruffin, J., said: “In short, there can be no homestead without a home or the immediate possibility of a home upon the land itself.”
In McCracken v. Adler, 98 N. C., 400 (404), it is declared: “But if the land proposed to be sold is all that the execution debtor has, he is entitled to have his homestead therein laid off to him, although there be no dwelling house or other habitable building thereon, because he may build a house and other buildings on the land, and thus have the beneficent provision of the Constitution. Flora v. Robbins, 93 N. C., 38; Murchison v. Plyler, 87 N. C., 79; Spoon v. Peid, 78 N. C., 244.” Farris v. Hendricks, 196 N. C., 439.
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Dunn, 209 N. C., 736, Devin, J., for the Court, said: “The right to the homestead exemption is guaranteed to every resident of North Carolina by the Constitution, and this right is not forfeited by a fraudulent conveyance.”
In the present action, defendants had reacquired ownership before final process of sale, and we think entitled to the homestead exemption allowed by the Constitution.
For the reasons given, the judgment below is
Reversed.