On the facts admitted in the pleadings and under the provisions of the benefit certificate sued on in this action, the plaintiff is entitled to the sum which was due on said certificate at the death of Albert Y. Sorrell.
The beneficiary designated in the certificate died before the death of Albert Y. Sorrell, the insured. He left surviving him no wife or child, no parent, grandchild, or sister. In such case, it is provided in the certificate that the benefits shall be paid to the next living relative of the insured. The plaintiff, as his only surviving brother, is the nearest living relation of Albert Y. Sorrell, deceased, and is therefore entitled to the sum due on the certificate at his death.
The defendant J. Bostwiek Cooke, who was made a party to the action after its commencement, on his own motion, is not entitled to- the sum due on the certificate, or to any part of said sum. He claims under the last will and testament of Quinnette Sorrell, deceased, who was the beneficiary designated in the certificate prior to her death. At no time during her life did she have any vested interest in the certificate which she could bequeath by her last will and testament. C. S., 6508.
Neither Quinnette Sorrell nor the defendant J. Bostwiek Cooke had any lien on the certificate or on the sum due on the certificate, for the sums paid by them as dues and assessments required to keep the certificate in force. In Pollock v. Household of Ruth, 150 N. C., 211, 63 *229S. E., 940, it is said: “There may he, and not infrequently are, facts and circumstances existing which would raise an equity in the original beneficiary and which would justify and require a court to interfere for his protection; but the authorities are very generally to the effect that the mere payment of the premiums and dues for a time, without more, and in the absence of a binding contract that the beneficiaries then designated should receive the proceeds of the policy or the benefits arising therefrom, would not support such a claim.”
The judgment is
Affirmed.