At tbe close of tbe State’s evidence tbe defendant made a motion in tbe court below (N. O. Code, 1935 [Micbie], sec. 4643) for judgment of nonsuit. Tbe court below overruled tbis motion, and in tbis we can see no error.
Tbe defendant was charged witb violating N. O. Code, 1935 (Micbie), sec. 4447: “If any busband shall willfully abandon bis wife without providing adequate support for such wife, and tbe children which be may have begotten upon her, be shall be guilty of a misdemeanor: Provided, *190that the abandonment of children by the father shall constitute a continuing offense and shall not be barred by any statute of limitations until the youngest living child shall arrive at the age of eighteen years.” Section 4447, O. S., by chapter 290, Public Laws 1925, was amended by adding the following: “Provided, that the abandonment of children by the father shall constitute a continuing offense, and shall not be barred by any statute of limitations until the youngest living child shall arrive at the age of eighteen years.” S. v. Bell, 184 N. C., 701.
In S. v. Jones, 201 N. C., 424, at pp. 425-6, it is said: “The object of the statute is to enforce the obligation, not by subjecting the father to a civil action at the instance of the children, but by the infliction of punishment for his dereliction. It would be a plain evasion of the legislative intent to hold that by suffering the penal consequences of a single violation of the statute the defendant could consign his destitute children to the embrace of charity and thus absolve himself from liability to further prosecution. Wharton defines a continuing offense as a transaction or a series of acts set on foot by a single impulse, and operated by an unintermittent force, no matter how long a time it may occupy. Crim. Pleading, 474. It is an offense which continues day by day. S. v. Hannon, 168 N. C., 215; S. v. Beam, 181 N. C., 597. The statute in express terms constitutes the abandonment of children by the father a continuing offense. The prosecution of an offense of this nature is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense charged to have been committed at any time before the institution of the first prosecution, but it is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for continuing the offense thereafter, as this is a new violation of the law. 16 C. J., 268, sec. 447. This general principle is fortified by the distinct provision that the statute of limitations shall not bar prosecution until the youngest living child shall arrive at the age of eighteen years.”
In S. v. Cook, 207 N. C., 261 (262), we find: “The word 'willfully’ as used in the statute under which the defendant was charged is used with the same import as in the act relating to willful abandonment of wife by husband, C. S., 4447, and what is said in the case of S. v. Falkner, 182 N. C., 793, as to the effect of the use of the word 'willful’ in a criminal statute is here applicable. In that case the present Chief Justice says: 'Willfulness is an essential element of the crime, and this must be found by the jury. The issue, upon an indictment for a violation of' the present law, is the alleged guilt of the defendant. He enters on the trial with the common-law presumption of innocence in his favor. When the State has shown an abandonment and the defendant’s failure to provide adequate support, the jury may infer from these facts, together with the attendant circumstances, and they would be warranted in finding, if they are so satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that it had been done *191intentionally without just cause or legal excuse, i.e., willfully. S. v. Taylor, 175 N. C., 833.’ To the same effect are the more recent cases of S. v. Johnson, 194 N. C., 378; S. v. Yelverton, 196 N. C., 64; S. v. Roberts, 197 N. C., 662.” S. v. Parker, ante, 32.
Erom a careful examination of the whole record, we think the court below tried the case in conformity with the statute on the subject and the decisions of this Court. We do not think that the exceptions and assignments of error to the judgment, refusal to give instructions prayed for by defendant, and those made to the charge of the court below can be sustained.
On the record we see no prejudicial or reversible error.
No error.
Devin, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this ease.