Plaintiff’s action is grounded on tbe principle, settled by numerous decisions, that a conveyance or devise to “Nonnie and ber children” vests in Nonnie and ber children then living, including any in ventre sa mere, as tenants in common, tbe present estate conveyed or devised. Tate v. Amos, 197 N. C., 159, 147 S. E., 809; Cunningham v. Worthington, 196 N. C., 778, 147 S. E., 294; Snowden v. Snowden, 187 N. C., 539, 122 S. E., 300; Benbury v. Butts, 184 N. C., 23, 113 S. E., 499; Cullens v. Cullens, 161 N. C., 344, 77 S. E., 228.
Tbe defendants, on tbe other band, say tbe doctrine announced in Boyd v. Campbell, 192 N. C., 398, 135 S. E., 121, Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394, 63 S. E., 79, and others to tbe effect that tbe “intent as gathered from tbe four corners of tbe instrument” is to govern, precludes tbe application of tbe principle invoked by plaintiff, because tbe deed in question, taken in its entirety, clearly excludes tbe children of tbe grantee as partakers witb tbeir mother in tbe estate conveyed. Tbe “children” appear only in tbe premises, while tbe operative words of conveyance, as contained in tbe granting clause, are “to said Nonnie A. Mayberry, ber heirs and assigns.” 8 R. C. L., 936 and 1046. This was tbe view of tbe trial court, and we agree witb bis decision.